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Article 
The Perfect Storm of Retirement 
Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool 
of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal 
Savings 
Stephen F. Befort† 
 
Sebastian Junger authored a highly acclaimed book in 
1997 entitled The Perfect Storm.1 He tells the story of a fishing 
boat based out of Gloucester, Massachusetts, that was lost at 
sea near Newfoundland during a 1991 Halloween nor’easter.2 
The Perfect Storm chronicles the unique mix of meteorological 
forces that coalesced to create a once-in-a-century maelstrom of 
devastating proportions.3 
Another potential perfect storm threatens the financial 
well being of future retirees in the United States. As with the 
Halloween nor’easter, this storm has the potential to cause ex-
ceptional damage due to the confluence of a unique set of cir-
cumstances. This time, however, the forces at work are actuar-
ial rather than meteorological. 
Two factors are principally responsible for the looming re-
tirement insecurity storm. First, the coming generation of re-
tirees will be large and long-lived. The retirement of the baby 
boom generation will create a retiree cohort historically un-
equaled in size. Continued increases in life expectancies prompt 
many analysts to anticipate that this cohort will have a retire-
 
†   Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School. The author thanks the University of Minnesota’s LI-
BRA research team (Professor Suzanne Thorpe and law students Marci Wind-
sheimer, Jody Ward, and Elise Chahla) for research assistance on this Article. 
Copyright © 2007 by Stephen F. Befort. 
 1. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM (HarperPerennial 1999) 
(1997). 
 2. Id. at 5, 90–92, 166–67. 
 3. Id. at 107–16. 
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ment span that also is beyond that experienced by any prior 
generation. The financial burden on the smaller contingent of 
working taxpayers to support this retiree group will be im-
mense.4 
Second, a growing proportion of American workers are fi-
nancially unprepared for retirement. The components of a fi-
nancially secure retirement are often analogized to a three-
legged stool.5 The financial platform of the stool is supported by 
three legs representing three sources of retirement income: (1) 
Social Security, (2) private pension plans, and (3) individual 
savings and assets. Observers have rightly focused considerable 
attention on the impending depletion of the Social Security 
Trust Funds. But less well known, yet also vitally important, 
are the precarious deficiencies in projected retirement assets in 
the form of employer-sponsored pensions and personal savings 
for a large segment of current workers. Shortfalls are forecast 
for all three legs of the retirement stool, making the financial 
prospects for many future retirees more shaky than secure. 
Fortunately, actuarial forces are less immutable than me-
teorological forces. Although the retirement insecurity prob-
lems are significant, there is still time to avoid the perfect 
storm by taking the steps necessary to shore up the retirement 
safety net. Until recently, however, Congress lacked the politi-
cal will to take meaningful action. While both political parties 
championed certain reforms, neither party was willing to en-
gage in the give-and-take necessary to craft what by necessity 
will be a package of likely unpopular reforms. 
The recently enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA),6 however, offers a glimmer of hope. This highly compli-
cated piece of legislation was forged in the give and take of a 
conference committee during the summer of 2006. Although the 
Act is far from perfect, it contains a number of largely benefi-
cial changes to the U.S. pension system. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it represents the type of bipartisan effort that will be 
needed to produce a full-blown package of reforms addressing 
all three legs of the retirement stool. 
 
 4. See infra notes 27–37 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Andrew A. Samwick, The Effects of Social Security Reform on 
Private Pensions, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES 189, 190 (Wil-
liam G. Gale et al. eds., 2004). 
 6. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 and 26 U.S.C.). 
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With the potential storm of retirement insecurity intensify-
ing and drawing nearer with each passing year, the time has 
come for Congress to build upon its experience with the PPA 
and to acknowledge the difficult reality that a restoration of re-
tirement security will require a combination of higher taxes, 
reduced benefits, and enhanced regulatory oversight. Fortu-
nately, the pain associated with embracing these solutions is 
far less serious than the pain associated with continuing inac-
tion. As this Article illustrates, the retirement safety net can be 
secured without systemic upheaval or considerable hardship, 
but through a practical agenda of modest reforms. 
Toward that end, this Article recommends a three-step re-
form agenda: (1) adopting a mix of tax increases and benefit re-
ductions, including a slight rise in the retirement age, that 
would eliminate the projected Social Security Trust Fund defi-
cit while still preserving the integrity of Social Security’s criti-
cal social insurance function; (2) making changes in the default 
settings for defined contribution pension plans that would both 
encourage plan participation and improve plan security; and (3) 
enacting a modest refundable tax credit that would encourage 
low- and middle-income wage earners to save for retirement, 
whether in a defined contribution plan or in a personal savings 
account. While these steps would not stave off the oncoming 
demographic changes in the retirement population, they would 
significantly enhance the United States’ ability to meet that 
challenge with a sturdy retirement security platform. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I reviews the cur-
rent status of retirement security in the United States. More 
particularly, this part identifies the underlying problems with 
each of the three legs of the retirement stool that threaten the 
financial security of future retirees. Part II then turns toward a 
discussion of the possible responses for avoiding the perfect 
storm scenario. After exploring various alternatives and re-
viewing the principal changes wrought by the PPA, the Article 
lays out a three-step reform plan designed to reinvigorate So-
cial Security, private pensions, and personal savings so as to 
provide shelter from the impending storm. 
I.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF RETIREMENT INSECURITY   
Most American retirees rely on three principal income 
streams in order to finance their retirement years. These three 
income streams are Social Security benefits, pension plan bene-
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fits, and accumulated private savings and assets.7 As demon-
strated below, each of these income streams is projected to pro-
vide substantially less than optimal resources for the next gen-
eration of retirees. 
A. SOCIAL SECURITY 
Social Security is a government-sponsored defined benefit 
program that provides approximately 40% of the total income 
that current retirees receive.8 From a budgetary standpoint, 
Social Security is the single largest program of the federal gov-
ernment with an annual outlay in excess of $500 billion or ap-
proximately 23% of total federal spending.9 First adopted in 
1935 as a tool to alleviate poverty among the elderly, Social Se-
curity is a hybrid program that includes both an income main-
tenance objective and an earned insurance-based entitlement 
objective.10 
Social Security is a near-universal program; more than 
90% of all Americans over the age of sixty-five receive benefits, 
either directly by virtue of having paid payroll taxes on at least 
ten years of earnings, or indirectly by virtue of being disabled 
or having an eligible spouse.11 As of 2004, about forty-eight mil-
lion Americans received Social Security benefits, while 159 mil-
lion American families paid taxes into the system.12 The aver-
age Social Security benefit amount payable to retirees as of 
December 2004 was $955 per month.13 The actual payment de-
 
 7. CHRISTIAN WELLER & EDWARD N. WOLFF, RETIREMENT INCOME: THE 
CRUCIAL ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 9 (2005); Richard Hinz, Overview of the 
United States Private Pension System, in PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND POL-
ICY ISSUES 23, 23 (2000). 
 8. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: ANSWERS 
TO KEY QUESTIONS 5 (2005). The Social Security Act was enacted in 1935, 
Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), and is codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301–1397jj (2000). 
 9. Budgetary Perspectives on the Outlook for Social Security Before the H. 
Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Douglas Holtz-
Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo 
.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6074&sequence=0. 
 10. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A PRIMER 1, 13–14 (2001). 
 11. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY BULLETIN 11 (2005), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ 
statcomps/supplement/2005/supplement05.pdf; WELLER & WOLFF, supra note 
7, at 14. 
 12. 2005 BD. TRS. FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & DISABILITY INS. 
TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP. 17 [hereinafter 2005 TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP.]; SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 2. 
 13. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 2. 
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pends upon the beneficiary’s past earnings; the calculation is 
based on a progressive formula designed to replace a larger 
share of earnings for low income as compared to high income 
earners.14 
The benefit amount also varies according to a worker’s age 
at retirement. While people traditionally view age sixty-five as 
the normal retirement age at which full benefits are payable, a 
1983 amendment is gradually increasing the full benefit age 
over time so that it will rise to age sixty-seven by 2022.15 Work-
ers may retire as early as age sixty-two and receive an actuari-
ally reduced benefit (currently 22% below that of full benefit 
age), while workers who retire later than the full benefit age 
receive an annual 8% boost for each year of deferred retirement 
until they reach the age of seventy.16 
Social Security benefits are financed primarily through a 
tax on earnings that is credited to the Social Security Trust 
Funds. Employees and employers each pay a payroll tax of 
6.2% of earnings up to a maximum taxable earnings base which 
is adjusted annually to reflect the growth in average wages.17 
The base was set at $90,000 for 2005, meaning that contribu-
tors did not pay payroll taxes on individual earnings above that 
amount.18 In addition to the payroll tax, a far smaller revenue 
stream is provided by the partial taxation of Social Security 
benefits received by higher income retirees.19 
Notably, the Social Security Trust Funds are not active in-
vestment accounts, but primarily serve as an accounting 
mechanism that tracks Social Security revenues and expendi-
tures. The Trust Funds hold no actual funds and do not refund 
future Social Security benefits. Instead, Social Security is a 
pay-as-you-go system that funds benefits out of current tax 
revenues.20 
 
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2000). 
 15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(l)(2)(E) (West 2004). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(q)–(w) (West Supp. 2006); CONG. BUDGET OF-
FICE, supra note 10, at 18–25; PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING 
SOCIAL SECURITY: A BALANCED APPROACH 14–26 (2004); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
supra note 11, at 18. 
 17. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 26; DIAMOND & ORSZAG, su-
pra note 16, at 24; SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., SOCIAL SECURITY: WHY ACTION 
SHOULD BE TAKEN SOON 2 (2005), available at http://www.ssab.gov/ 
documents/WhyActionShouldbeTakenSoon.pdf. 
 18. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 11, 14. 
 19. Id. at 20. 
 20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 26–28; June E. O’Neill, Why 
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The good news from an accounting standpoint is that the 
Social Security Trust Funds are currently maintaining a posi-
tive $1.5 trillion balance.21 The bad news is that a budgetary 
train wreck is looming on the horizon. The 2005 Annual Report 
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds Board of Trustees provides a snapshot 
of the problem.22 Beginning in 2017, total Social Security bene-
fit outlays will exceed projected tax revenues.23 This negative 
balance will worsen over time; the result will be that the com-
bined Social Security Trust Fund will be fully exhausted by 
2041.24 By then, only current tax revenues will pay Social Secu-
rity benefits, and these revenues will finance just 74% of sched-
uled payments.25 Over the course of the seventy-five-year pro-
jection period, Social Security will fall $4 trillion short of the 
funding necessary to maintain current benefit levels.26 
Much of this shortfall has to do with projected demographic 
changes affecting the size of the benefit-receiving cohort as 
compared with the size of the taxpayer, wage-earning cohort. 
Two principal factors are affecting this equation. The first is in-
creasing life spans. When the government set the retirement 
age at sixty-five in 1937, the average American life expectancy 
was only sixty-three years.27 Today, life expectancy in the 
United States is about seventy-seven years.28 Life expectancy 
at age sixty-five has increased by four years for men and five 
years for women since Social Security first paid monthly bene-
fits in 1940, and experts expect it to continue to rise.29 
Second, the coming retirement of the post-World War II 
baby boom generation will further exacerbate this growth in 
the number of future benefit recipients.30 As the large group of 
baby boomers exits the workforce, the proportion of the popula-
 
Social Security Needs Fundamental Reform, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 83–84 (2004). 
 21. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 29. 
 22. 2005 TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP., supra note 12, at 11. 
 23. Id. at 2–3. 
 24. Id. at 2–3, 7–8. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. Id. at 13. 
 27. David Wyss, Social Security: The Economic Issues, BUS. WK. ONLINE, 
Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2005/ 
pi20050331_8478_pi076.htm. 
 28. Infoplease, Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2004, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
 29. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 58–64. 
 30. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 29–32. 
BEFORT_4FMT 4/13/2007 11:19:19 AM 
944 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:938 
 
tion over the age of sixty-five will swell from 12% in 2005 to 
approximately 20% in 2030.31 In contrast, the number of future 
wage earners is projected to grow at a much slower pace, re-
flecting a relative decline in both fertility and immigration 
rates.32 This decline, in particular, is fueled by a significant 
drop in the birth rate from over three children per woman dur-
ing the baby boom era to approximately two children per 
woman in subsequent years.33 Social Security actuaries predict 
that the fertility rate will stabilize at 1.95 children per 
woman.34 Finally, a continuing decline in retirement age affects 
the relative size of the two cohorts. Although the normal re-
tirement age at which a worker becomes eligible for full Social 
Security retirement benefits is sixty-five, more than one-half of 
all American workers choose to retire at the early eligibility age 
of sixty-two.35 
The combined effect of these demographic factors is star-
tling. While the number of retirees is projected to grow by 90% 
between now and 2030, the number of wage-earning taxpayers 
is projected to grow by only 15%.36 As a result, the number of 
workers per beneficiary will drop from 3.3 to 2.2 by 2030.37 
The bottom line is that unless Congress adopts a solution, 
retirees will receive only 74% of scheduled benefits in 2041, and 
this percentage will continue to decrease for the remainder of 
the seventy-five-year projection period.38 This decline would 
have a severe, if not devastating, impact on the many Ameri-
cans who depend on Social Security benefits as their principal 
 
 31. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 10. 
 32. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 74–77; SOC. SEC. ADVISORY 
BD., supra note 17, at 12. 
 33. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 12. 
 34. Id. 
 35. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 21–22; JONATHAN GRUBER & 
DAVID A. WISE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT AROUND THE WORLD 16–
18 (1999). Other factors contributing to the looming Social Security deficit in-
clude growing income inequality, which leaves a larger portion of high-end 
earnings exempt from the payroll tax, and the legacy debt burden resulting 
from the fact that the first generation of Social Security benefit recipients re-
ceived far more in benefits than it paid in contributions. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, 
supra note 16, at 64–74. 
 36. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 37. See 2005 TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP., supra note 12, at 9; GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 21–22; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra 
note 10, at 31–33. 
 38. 2005 TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP., supra note 12, at 8 (projecting a decline 
to 68% of scheduled benefits by 2079). 
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or only source of retirement income. At present, the Social Se-
curity program provides more than one-half of all income for 
65% of retirees and more than 90% of all income for one-third of 
retirees; it constitutes the sole source of income for 21% of cur-
rent beneficiaries.39 
But the benefit gap is only part of the problem. The growth 
of the retiree cohort also means that projected Social Security 
outlays—even without any increase in taxes—will climb by ap-
proximately 50% from a current 4.2% of GDP to 6.5% of GDP 
by 2030.40 Increasing age and health care pressures in the 
Medicaid and Medicare programs will compound this burden on 
the federal budget.41 Taken together, these three federal enti-
tlement programs, which now consume approximately 8% of 
GDP, will grow to about 15% of GDP by 2030 in the absence of 
any major policy changes.42 
The result is a projected combination of declining benefits 
and increasing taxes. Any long-term solution inevitably will re-
quire more of either or both. So far, elected representatives 
have demonstrated a lack of political will to support either of 
these painful paths. 
B. PENSION PLANS 
1. Types of Plans 
The American pension system is, in many respects, a re-
verse image of the Social Security system. Pensions in the 
United States are wholly voluntary and exist independent of 
any government mandate. Also, unlike Social Security, virtu-
ally all pensions in the United States are sponsored by employ-
ers rather than by the government.43 The only governmental 
 
 39. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 11; SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., su-
pra note 17, at 25. 
 40. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 29, 42. 
 41. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 27 (stating that the 
rapid expected growth rates in these two programs “reflect not only a burgeon-
ing beneficiary population but also the escalation of health care costs at rates 
well exceeding general rates of inflation”). Health care costs currently are sky-
rocketing at double-digit annual rates, four times as fast as the annual rise in 
wages. David S. Broder, Op-Ed, To Save U.S. Health Care System from Cer-
tain Disaster, Drastic Surgery Is Needed, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 15, 
2004, at A12. 
 42. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 10, at 42; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 8, at 29. 
 43. PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (William G. Gale et 
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role in the U.S. pension scheme is the provision of tax incen-
tives for plan contributions and the regulatory safety net im-
posed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA).44 
Pensions in the United States fall into two broad catego-
ries: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. Tra-
ditional defined benefit plans provide a predetermined, speci-
fied retirement benefit, usually in the form of a life annuity, 
linked to pre-retirement earnings.45 Employers must provide 
universal coverage to qualified employees, but employees gen-
erally are not required to contribute.46 Defined benefit plans 
typically are funded solely by the sponsoring employer, and 
plan contributions are held in a single trust on behalf of all par-
ticipants.47 
Defined contribution plans, such as employer-sponsored 
401(k) plans, in contrast, promise only a contribution rate to an 
employee’s individual account, and both employers and em-
ployees typically contribute to such plans.48 Individual workers 
must make a number of key decisions concerning defined con-
tribution plans, such as whether to participate, how much to 
contribute, how to allocate investments, and when and how to 
withdraw funds.49 
 
al. eds., 2000). 
 44. Hinz, supra note 7, at 24–25; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000); Pen-
sion Coverage Lessons for the United States and Other Countries, AARP PUB. 
POL’Y INST. (Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 2, avail-
able at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2004_01_intl_coverage.pdf. 
 45. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE 
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 16 (2004); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based 
Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, EBRI IS-
SUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2005, at 1, 4–
5, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-20051.pdf. 
 46. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 16; Copeland, supra note 45, 
at 5. 
 47. Copeland, supra note 45, at 5. 
 48. A 401(k) plan is named after the Internal Revenue Code requirements 
that such a plan must meet to be a qualified plan entitled to special tax treat-
ment. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000 & West Supp. 2003). While 401(k) plans are 
the most prevalent type of defined contribution plan, other defined contribu-
tion formats include individual retirement accounts, profit-sharing plans, and 
employee stock ownership plans. See Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & 
How to Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 69, 78 (2002). 
 49. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 16; Robert L. Clark & Syl-
vester J. Schieber, The Transition to Hybrid Pension Plans in the United 
States: An Empirical Analysis, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES, 
supra note 5, at 11, 12–14. 
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A crucial distinction between the two plan types concerns 
which party bears the investment risk associated with plan as-
sets. In defined benefit plans, the employer bears the risk of in-
vestment shortfalls, while in defined contribution plans, indi-
vidual employees bear this risk.50 
Two historical trends illustrate the prevalence of pension 
coverage in the United States. First, pensions are a twentieth-
century phenomenon; comparatively few private pension plans 
existed prior to World War II.51 Tax policy and managerial de-
sires to attract skilled, long-term workers spurred the growth 
of pensions and other fringe benefits during the war and the 
years immediately following.52 This growth continued over the 
next few decades as the number of American workers covered 
by pension plans more than doubled between 1950 and 1979.53 
By that latter year, approximately 50% of all private-sector 
workers were covered by a pension.54 However, this upward 
trend stagnated in the 1980s, and following a modest uptick 
during the strong economy of the 1990s, overall pension cover-
age has declined since the turn of the century.55 While esti-
mates vary by methodology, most studies agree that fewer than 
half of all U.S. workers currently participate in an employer-
sponsored pension plan.56 The non-covered group includes a 
disproportionately large number of female, Hispanic, and low-
 
 50. PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 43, at 26; 
Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 12–14; Copeland, supra note 45, at 5. 
 51. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Private Pensions: Issues and 
Options, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 183, 183–84 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 
2003). 
 52. See MERTON BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10 
(1964). 
 53. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & DANIEL E. SMITH, PENSIONS IN THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY 3–4 (1983). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Copeland, supra note 45, at 16, 25; Ron Bigler, Lack of Pension Cover-
age a Reality for More Than Half of U.S. Workers, LABOR RESEARCH ASS’N 
ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2002, http://www.laborresearch.org/story2.php/95. 
 56. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, MARCH 2005, at 6 (2005) (50%); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: ISSUES OF COVERAGE AND INCREASING CONTRIBU-
TION LIMITS FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 3 (2001) (47%); Bigler, supra 
note 55 (44.5%); Copeland, supra note 45, at 16, 25 (41.9%). 
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wage workers.57 Employees of smaller firms and part-time 
workers also are more likely to lack pension coverage.58 
The second major trend concerns the relative decline in de-
fined benefit pension plans and the concomitant increase in de-
fined contribution plans. Through the 1970s, traditional de-
fined benefit plans predominated. In 1975, for example, 87% of 
all workers covered by a pension plan participated in a defined 
benefit plan.59 Since 1980, however, there has been a signifi-
cant shift toward defined contribution plans. While the number 
of employees covered by a defined benefit plan fell 25% between 
1980 and 2000, the number participating in a defined contribu-
tion plan jumped 250%.60 As of 2005, twice as many American 
workers were covered by defined contribution plans as com-
pared to defined benefit plans.61 Of those with pension cover-
age, only 19% of U.S. households are currently covered by a de-
fined benefit plan, while 58% are covered solely by a defined 
contribution plan, and 23% participate in both types of plans.62 
The movement away from defined benefit plans becomes 
even more pronounced when hybrid plans, such as cash balance 
plans, are added to the mix. Such plans combine the various at-
tributes of the defined benefit and defined contribution re-
gimes. A cash balance plan, for example, defines a worker’s re-
tirement account based on an annual contribution rate plus a 
guaranteed rate of accumulating interest on the account bal-
ance.63 Although technically funded and regulated as a type of 
defined benefit plan, cash balance plans resemble defined con-
tribution plans in that the plan sponsor may peg the annual 
rate of return to an index that reflects actual economic or in-
vestment performance.64 Many employers that switch to cash 
 
 57. PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 43, at 29–
30; Copeland, supra note 45, at 7–12. 
 58. PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 43, at 29–
30. 
 59. Id. at 27. 
 60. Copeland, supra note 45, at 5. 
 61. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 56, at 6. 
 62. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 3. 
 63. Kenneth R. Elliott & James H. Moore, Jr., Cash Balance Pension 
Plans: The New Wave, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Summer 
2000, at 3, 4; Christian E. Weller, PURE: A Proposal for More Retirement Se-
curity 3 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Technical Paper No. 265, 2003), http://www.epinet 
.org/technicalpapers/tp265-2003.pdf. 
 64. See Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 15; Elliott & Moore, supra 
note 63, at 4. 
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balance plans also reduce their overall level of plan contribu-
tions.65 As a result, when a typical defined benefit plan is con-
verted to a typical cash balance plan, a majority of workers re-
ceive lower overall benefits.66 As of 2004, approximately 11% of 
all Fortune 1000 firms had frozen or terminated their defined 
benefit plans while instituting or maintaining cash balance or 
defined contribution plans for future purposes.67 
What is driving this fundamental restructuring of the pen-
sion landscape? A recent survey of American employers identi-
fied two principal motivating factors: (1) reducing cost and 
funding volatility, and (2) achieving long-term cost savings.68 
Because defined benefit plans guarantee a specific benefit pay-
out regardless of economic circumstances, employers bear a 
substantial risk of potential liability in the event of a fund’s 
substandard investment performance. The 2000–03 recession, 
during which many fund balances plummeted in value, vividly 
illustrates this risk.69 A switch toward defined contribution or 
cash balance plans also enables employers to reduce costs while 
requiring employees to share funding responsibilities (defined 
contribution plans) or, at least, a greater share of the plan’s in-
vestment risk (cash balance plans).70 In short, a move away 
from defined benefit plans enables employers to shift some of 
their risks and costs to workers.71 Substituting a cash balance 
plan for an existing defined benefit plan also enables employers 
to avoid the high excise taxes required of an employer that 
 
 65. Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 24–25; Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 693–94 (2000). 
 66. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: INFORMATION ON 
CASH BALANCE PLANS 6 (2005). 
 67. Jack VanDerhei, Defined Benefit Plan Freezes: Who’s Affected, How 
Much, and Replacing Lost Accruals, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Re-
search Inst., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2006, at 1, 3–6, available at http://www.ebri 
.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_03-20063.pdf. 
 68. Mercer Human Resource Consulting, A Closer Look at Recent High-
Profile Pension Plan Freezes 2–3, http://wrg.wmmercer.com/pub/ps/34336/p/ 
5/blurb/65300/article/20066125 (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
 69. Steve Kerstein, A Proposal for Pension Funding Reform, J. PENSION 
BENEFITS, Spring 2005, at 3, 3; Beverly G. Landstrom, Resolving Problems in 
Pension Plan Funding, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 
28, 28. 
 70. Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 12–15, 24–25. 
 71. Id.; see also VanDerhei, supra note 67, at 6 (noting that employers 
gave reduced costs and shifting investment risk as reasons for freezing defined 
benefit plans). 
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seeks to recapture excess assets upon the termination of a de-
fined benefit plan.72 
2. Three Pension Problem Areas 
a. Overall Coverage 
The most over-arching problem with the current pension 
regime in the United States is the lack of overall coverage. As 
noted above, fewer than half of all U.S. workers currently par-
ticipate in an employer-sponsored pension plan of any type.73 
Put another way, approximately seventy million American 
workers today face the prospect of retirement with no pension 
leg on their already shaky retirement stool.74 In addition, more 
specific shortcomings exist with respect to both defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans. 
b. Defined Benefit Plans 
 i. Inadequate Funding 
An increasing number of defined benefit plan sponsors fail 
to fulfill their pension promises. One factor contributing to this 
phenomenon is the fact that many traditional defined benefit 
plans are dangerously underfunded. Between 1999 and 2004 
the level of overall pension funding fell from 130% of liabilities 
to 90% of liabilities in current-value terms.75 Presently, more 
than one-half of all defined benefit plans are underfunded, fac-
ing a cumulative shortfall of $450 billion.76 The result is a seri-
 
 72. I.R.C. § 4980(d)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (providing for a 50% excise tax 
on the reversion of excess assets from a terminated defined benefit plan); 
Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 16. 
 73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 74. How to Improve Pension Coverage for American Workers, Hearing Be-
fore the H. Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on 
Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Michael A. 
Calebrese, Director, Public Assets Program, New America Foundation), avail-
able at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedcew6-119.000/hedcew6 
-119.htm. 
 75. Jerry Geisel, Pension Funding Recovering Slowly, BUS. INS., Apr. 18, 
2005, at 4, 4. 
 76. Charles J. Ford et al., Weaknesses in Defined Benefit Pension Funding 
Rules: A Look at the Largest Plans, 1995–2002, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 357–59 
(2006); Dennis Simon, Pension Funding Potholes: Can Private Equity Navigate 
the New Terrain?, 8 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 86, 86 (2005). 
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ous disconnect between promises made by pension plan spon-
sors and the funding available to fulfill those promises. 
For two reasons the shortfall is likely even worse than 
these numbers suggest. First, the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (PBGC) has assumed responsibility for a number 
of the most seriously underfunded defined benefit plans. The 
PBGC is a federal agency, funded by premiums charged to cov-
ered defined benefit plans, that assumes responsibility for a 
portion of a sponsor’s pension obligations in the event of a plan 
default.77 In 2000, the PBGC was maintaining a $9.7 billion 
surplus.78 By 2004, the agency reported a $23.3 billion deficit 
following its takeover of several large terminating plans.79 With 
financially distressed firms currently responsible for a com-
bined underfunding of almost $100 billion dollars in their spon-
sored plans, a sizeable bailout of the PBGC program soon may 
be necessary.80 
Second, the fact that the pension plan funding rules in ex-
istence prior to the PPA permitted plan sponsors to maintain 
funding at less than socially desirable levels exacerbated the 
funding problem. Valuation rules, for example, gave plans wide 
latitude in adopting assumptions for measuring the current 
value of assets and liabilities, and many plan sponsors chose 
assumptions that overstated funding levels.81 Further, while 
 
 77. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: BASICS OF 
THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION 1 (2005), http://www.ebri 
.org/pdf/publications/facts/0705fact.pdf. The PBGC guarantees payment of ba-
sic pension benefits for approximately forty-four million workers and retirees 
participating in more than thirty-one thousand private-sector defined benefit 
pension plans. Id. The PBGC guarantees retirement benefits under a defined 
benefit plan up to a maximum monthly amount. As of 2005, the maximum 
payment for a single life annuity at age sixty-five was $3,801.14 per month. Id. 
at 2. 
 78. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 351. 
 79. Single-Employer Pension Plan Restructuring, Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Pension Plan Hearing] (statement of Bradley 
Belt, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation); Ford et al., 
supra note 76, at 351. 
 80. Pension Plan Hearing, supra note 79, at 2; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: RECENT EXPERIENCES OF LARGE DEFINED BENE-
FIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05294.pdf; Ford et al., supra note 76, at 351, 
379. 
 81. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 360–62; Frank J. Fabozzi & Ronald J. 
Ryan, Reforming Pension Reform, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INT’L EDITION, 
Jan. 2005, at 54, 54–55. 
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ERISA nominally assessed an additional funding charge (AFC) 
when the actuarial value of a plan’s assets fell below 90% of li-
abilities, accounting credits and other exceptions caused the 
AFC to be assessed in practice only if a plan fell to a 75–80% 
funding level.82  
The termination of Bethlehem Steel’s defined benefit plan 
in 2002, which resulted in the then-largest PBGC claim in his-
tory,83 provides a vivid illustration of these regulatory short-
comings. In 2002, Bethlehem Steel’s Form 5500 filing reported 
that its plan was 85% funded on a current liability basis.84 
Later that same year, the plan terminated with actual assets of 
less than one-half the current value of promised benefits.85 Yet, 
from 2000 to 2002, Bethlehem Steel was not required to make 
an AFC contribution.86 Following plan termination, the PBGC 
assumed a $3.7 billion charge to defray the plan’s $4.3 billion 
shortfall.87 In short, Bethlehem Steel effectively shifted its 
funding shortfall to its employees and the federal government. 
 ii. Cash Balance Conversions 
Many employers also abandon defined benefit promises in 
the context of converting to cash balance plans. These conver-
sions fundamentally alter the methods of benefit accumulation. 
Benefit accruals in defined benefit plans typically are back-
loaded such that they increase significantly the closer a long-
term worker gets to retirement.88 Cash balance plans, on the 
other hand, generally employ a more level pattern of accrual 
throughout a worker’s career.89 A conversion of a defined bene-
 
 82. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 362–74. To prevent funding levels from 
falling too low, plan sponsors generally are required to make additional fund-
ing contributions to underfunded plans in the amount of a percentage of the 
unfunded liability. Id. at 356. 
 83. Pension Plan Hearing, supra note 79, at 6. 
 84. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 362. Form 5500 is a disclosure form that 
private sector employers with defined benefit plans are required to file annu-
ally with the Internal Revenue Service and the PBGC. Id. at 352 n.5. 
 85. Id. at 362. 
 86. Pension Plan Hearing, supra note 79, at 8; Ford et al., supra note 76, 
at 368. 
 87. Pension Plan Hearing, supra note 79, at 6, 9; Ford et al., supra note 
76, at 362. 
 88. Elliott & Moore, supra note 63, at 4; Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy 
Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 
388 (2000). 
 89. Elliott & Moore, supra note 63, at 4; Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, 
at 392–93, 399. 
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fit plan to a cash balance plan, as a result, bolsters the accrual 
rates for younger workers, but diminishes the accrual rates for 
long-term workers.90 
Many employers voluntarily cushion the impact of a plan 
conversion on older workers by providing transitional benefits 
such as a monetary bonus or the option to continue coverage 
under the prior defined benefit formula.91 Other employers, 
however, compound the negative impact on older workers by 
implementing a “wear-away” period. Under ERISA, an em-
ployer is free to set the new cash balance benefit value at what-
ever level it desires so long as the employer maintains, at a 
minimum, the employee’s previous level of benefit accrual for 
payout purposes.92 If an employer, upon a cash balance conver-
sion, sets the new benefit level below the previous defined bene-
fit accrual level, the employer may freeze the older worker’s 
benefit accrual under the new plan until the excess defined 
benefit level is “worn away” and matches the rising cash benefit 
account.93 In such circumstances, the older worker suffers a 
double whammy: (1) the loss of expected defined benefit back-
loading, and (2) a wear-away period during which the worker 
receives no benefit for the new cash balance plan.94  
c. Defined Contribution Plans 
 i. Lack of Employee Participation 
Problems also exist in the increasingly important realm of 
defined contribution plans. The most significant issue here con-
cerns the relatively low level of employee participation even 
when an employer sponsors a 401(k) plan. While employees 
 
 90. Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 398–405; Zelinsky, supra note 65, 
at 695–99. 
 91. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 25–26; Forman 
& Nixon, supra note 88, at 406. 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1) (2000); Clark & Schieber, supra note 49, at 23; 
Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 401–02, 414. 
 93. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 402–05; Zelinsky, supra note 
65, at 702–04. 
 94. Hybrid (Cash Balance) Pension Plans, Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Retirement Security and Aging of the H. Comm. on Health, Educa-
tion, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of David Certner, Di-
rector of Federal Affairs, American Association of Retired Persons), available 
at http://www.aarp.org/research/press-center/testimony/cash_balance.html; 
Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 403–05, 407–08; Zelinsky, supra note 65, 
at 702–04. 
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covered by defined benefit plans are automatic participants in 
those plans, employees covered by a defined contribution plan 
have the option to choose or reject participation.95 Recent stud-
ies show that roughly one-fourth to one-third of all employees 
covered by a defined contribution plan opt not to participate.96 
Since participation in a defined contribution plan occurs only 
when a covered employee affirmatively elects to contribute to 
the plan, this negative choice typically reflects either inertia, 
an inability to pay, or a conscious choice to prefer current dis-
posable income over deferred retirement benefits, even when 
enhanced by an employer’s promise of a matching contribu-
tion.97 Not surprisingly, young and low-income workers are the 
most likely not to participate.98 
The problem of non-participation often is compounded by 
frequent job turnover. More than one-half of all workers cov-
ered by a 401(k) plan take cash out of their plans when they 
change jobs.99 Although one of the principal advantages of de-
fined contribution plans is the potential for roll-overs and other 
devices to create a mobile retirement savings plan,100 the lure 
of a new boat or the pressure of mounting debt too often takes 
precedence over the accumulation of retirement assets. Studies 
 
 95. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 55. 
 96. Brigette C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Iner-
tia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1158–
63 (2001) (reporting a 23% non-participation rate in 401(k) plans among em-
ployees with five to ten years of tenure); Alicia H. Munnell et al., What Deter-
mines 401(k) Participation and Contributions?, SOC. SEC. BULL., Jan. 2002, at 
64 (noting a 28% non-participation rate based on 1998 data); Glenn R. Spring-
stead & Theresa M. Wilson, Participation in Voluntary Individual Savings Ac-
counts: An Analysis of IRAs, 401(k)s, and the TSP, SOC. SEC. BULL., July 2000, 
at 35 (finding that 33% of eligible workers do not participate in 401(k) plans). 
 97. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 55–67; James F. Moore & 
Olivia S. Mitchell, Projected Retirement Wealth and Savings Adequacy, in 
FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 68, 87 (Olivia S. 
Mitchell et al. eds., 2000) (hypothesizing that the need to spend current in-
come, misinformation regarding life expectancy, and a general discounting of 
the future may contribute to shortfalls in savings). 
 98. Robert L. Clark et al., Making the Most of 401(k) Plans: Who’s Choos-
ing What and Why?, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT 
WEALTH, supra note 97, at 95, 97; Springstead & Wilson, supra note 96, at 35–
36. 
 99. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 133; Lee Walczak & Richard 
S. Dunham, I Want My Safety Net, BUS. WK., May 16, 2005, at 24, 32. 
 100. See Hinz, supra note 7, at 29 (explaining that needs and interests may 
be better met by defined contribution plans due to, inter alia, the high mobility 
of some workers); Munnell et al., supra note 96, at 65 (“[401(k) plans are] more 
appealing to a younger, more mobile workforce.”). 
BEFORT_4FMT 4/13/2007 11:19:19 AM 
2007] RETIREMENT INSECURITY 955 
 
indicate that the $37,000 median 401(k) balance of workers be-
tween the ages of forty-five and fifty-four is less than one quar-
ter of the amount that would be expected for a similarly situ-
ated worker who had not prematurely withdrawn funds from 
his or her account.101 
 ii. Over-Concentration in Company Stock 
A second problem with respect to defined contribution 
plans concerns the substantial amount of fund assets invested 
in the company stock of participants’ employers. This invest-
ment concentration is at odds with the consensus view that the 
preferable allocation of fund assets is in a diversified portfo-
lio.102 When all of a worker’s retirement eggs are concentrated 
in one basket, the risk of financial retirement insecurity in-
creases exponentially.103 
The Enron debacle provides the most vivid illustration of 
the dangers flowing from an over-concentration in company 
stock. At the end of 2000, employees of the energy trading firm 
that was then the seventh-largest U.S. corporation104 held $2.1 
billion in the firm’s sponsored 401(k) plan. Sixty-two percent, or 
$1.3 billion, of those assets were invested in Enron stock which, 
at the time, was trading at more than $80 per share.105 As dis-
guised operating losses and accounting manipulations came to 
light in 2001, the value of Enron stock plunged. By December 
2001, Enron declared bankruptcy, and its stock became worth-
 
 101. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 35; see also Patrick Purcell, 
Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2000: Analysis of Census Bureau 
Data, 29 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 48, 61 (2003) (noting that the me-
dian value of retirement savings accounts for workers between the ages of 
forty-five and fifty-four years old was $28,000 in 2000). 
 102. See, e.g., Harry M. Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, 46 J. 
FIN. 469, 470 (1991); J. Mark Iwry, Promoting 401(k) Security, TAX POL’Y IS-
SUES & OPTIONS 2 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1, 
2003, at 2, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310876_promoting_401k_ 
security.pdf. 
 103. See Lisa Meulbroek, Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is 
It? (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 02-0258, 2002) (on file with author) 
(reporting on a study estimating that the average volatility of a single stock 
portfolio is twice as great as that of a well-diversified portfolio). 
 104. Janice Kay Lawrence, Pension Reform in the Aftermath of Enron: 
Congress’ Failure to Deliver the Promise of Secure Retirement to 401(k) Plan 
Participants, 92 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2003). 
 105. JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., ARE EMPOWERMENT AND EDUCATION ENOUGH?: 
UNDER-DIVERSIFICATION IN 401(K) PLANS 3 (2005), available at http://www 
.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea_macro/forum/200509bpea_ 
laibson.pdf; Reece, supra note 48, at 92. 
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less.106 As a result, thousands of current and retired Enron em-
ployees lost the bulk of their retirement savings.107 
The Enron story is not an isolated incident. Similar fates 
have befallen participants in several other large corporate pen-
sion plans during the past decade, including plans sponsored by 
Lucent, Polaroid, and Global Crossing.108 In each instance, 
workers who were overly dependent on the financial fortunes of 
their employers suffered the double loss of both a current job 
and future retirement security.109 
The pertinent data concerning 401(k) company stock hold-
ings brings the extent of this problem into better focus. As of 
2000, company stock represented approximately 19% of all 
401(k) assets.110 These company stock assets primarily are con-
centrated in plans sponsored by larger firms. Only about 10% of 
plan sponsors include company stock in their portfolios,111 but 
those plans cover 42% of all defined contribution plan partici-
pants.112 Within this subset of plan sponsors, approximately 
 
 106. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 3; Reece, supra note 48, at 97–98. 
 107. Reece, supra note 48, at 99. 
 108. Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, 401(k)s and Company Stock: 
How Can We Encourage Diversification?, AN ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Re-
search, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), July 2002, at 7, http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/ 
issues/ib_9.pdf. 
 109. Iwry, supra note 102, at 2 (noting that heavy pension plan investment 
in company stock is particularly risky because “[i]f the employer falls on hard 
times, the worker stands to lose not only a job but also his or her retirement 
savings”). 
 110. Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Ac-
count Balances, and Loan Activity in 2000, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee 
Benefit Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2001, at 10 tbl.5, http://www 
.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1101ib.pdf. 
 111. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 7; William E. Even & David Macpher-
son, Company Stock in Pension Funds, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 299, 306 tbl.2 (2004). 
In 2001, 51.9% of firms with 5000 or more employees offered company stock in 
their 401(k) plans, while only 4.9% of firms with fewer than fifty employees 
did so. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 100. 
 112. Retirement Security: Picking Up the Enron Pieces: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 63 (2002) [hereinafter VanDerhei Hearing] 
(statement of Jack L. VanDerhei, Research Director, Employee Benefit Re-
search Institute), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/testimony/ 
t135.pdf; Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, The Role of Company Stock in 
Defined Contribution Plans, in THE PENSION CHALLENGE: RISK TRANSFERS 
AND RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 33, 41 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smet-
ters eds., 2003); see also Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, The Role of 
Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9250, 2002) [hereinafter Mitchell & Utkus, The 
Role of Company Stock], available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9250. 
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30% of plan assets take the form of company stock,113 and 45% 
of plan participants have concentrated company stock positions 
in excess of 20% of their portfolios.114 Over five million plan 
participants, or about one in ten Americans with 401(k) hold-
ings, have invested more than 60% of their account balances in 
company stock.115 
Company stock can end up in a plan in either of two ways. 
First, a plan sponsor can offer company stock as one of the in-
vestment options available to plan participants.116 Second, a 
plan sponsor can direct its own matching contribution in the 
form of company stock.117 About 45% of all firms offering com-
pany stock as an option also make matching contributions ex-
clusively in company stock;118 this was the case with Enron.119 
Where this combination occurs, individual holdings in company 
stock become substantially more concentrated. While employ-
ees with a company stock option invest 22% of their contribu-
tions in company stock, those employed in firms that also have 
a directed company stock match end up with 53% of their as-
sets invested in company stock.120 Interestingly, about one-
third of this greater concentration is attributable to increases 
in the voluntary employee selection of company stock.121 
The over-concentration problem is further exacerbated by 
the policy of many firms to restrict the ability of participants to 
diversify their company stock match. According to a survey 
published in 2001, 85% of plans using a company stock match 
 
 113. VanDerhei Hearing, supra note 112, at 63; Susan J. Stabile, Another 
Look at 401(k) Investments in Employer Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
539, 542 (2002). 
 114. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 102; Sarah Holden & Jack 
VanDerhei, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity 
in 2001, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), 
Mar. 2003, at 9 fig.7, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0303ib.pdf. 
 115. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 112, at 34–42. 
 116. Munnell & Sundén, supra note 108, at 4. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Reece, supra note 48, at 91–92. Enron offered its own company 
stock as an investment choice and also matched employee contributions with 
shares of Enron stock. As is common with many 401(k) plans, Enron provided 
a 50% match on employee contributions up to 6% of base pay. Id. 
 120. Holden & VanDerhei, supra note 110, at 11 tbl.6. 
 121. Id. While employees with a company stock option make 22% of their 
401(k) investments in company stock, those with both a company stock option 
and a directed match make 33% of their elective investments in company 
stock. Id. 
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placed some restriction on employee diversification, although 
there is some evidence that this percentage is now declining.122 
Once again, the Enron scenario provides a typical example. En-
ron restricted plan participants from selling any of the matched 
Enron company stock prior to reaching age fifty.123 As a result, 
many Enron employees could only watch helplessly as a signifi-
cant chunk of their 401(k) assets crashed and burned.124 
With diversification widely lauded as an investment strat-
egy, why are so many 401(k) portfolios so heavily laden with 
company stock? Three factors appear to be at work. 
First, many employers view a strong 401(k) stock posture 
as a favorable business strategy. Some of the reasons fre-
quently cited in support of this viewpoint are the following: 
● a plan participant stake in company stock increases 
productivity by aligning the financial interests of 
employers and employees; 
● employer contributions in the form of newly issued 
stock preserve employer cash reserves; and 
● 401(k) holdings of company stock helps to deter hostile 
takeovers by keeping a sizeable chunk of company stock in 
friendly hands.125 
More concretely, employers can benefit financially through 
plan holdings of company stock in that dividend payments, 
which normally are not tax deductible by companies, may be 
deducted if paid to shareholders holding company stock in a de-
fined contribution plan structured as either an employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP) or a hybrid KSOP plan.126 About one-
half of all defined contribution plans holding company stock are 
structured in such a fashion.127 
Second, many employee plan participants also perceive ad-
vantages in electing to hold company stock in their plan portfo-
 
 122. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 102. 
 123. Reece, supra note 48, at 92. 
 124. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 125. See, e.g., MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 106–10; Even & 
Macpherson, supra note 111, at 300–01; Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 112, at 
46–50. 
 126. See I.R.C. § 404(k) (2000); Iwry, supra note 102, at 3; Reece, supra 
note 48, at 88. An ESOP is a defined contribution plan designed to be invested 
primarily in the employer’s stock. Iwry, supra note 102, at 2. A KSOP is cre-
ated when “a company marries its 401(k) to its ESOP.” Reece, supra note 48, 
at 88. 
 127. Even & Macpherson, supra note 111, at 307 tbl.2. 
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lios. Here, the evidence points to a mixture of loyalty and greed 
as motivating factors. With regard to the former, some employ-
ees see an ownership stake in their employing entity as an ex-
pression of loyalty and support.128 As to the latter, in spite of 
the conventional wisdom supporting a diversified investment 
strategy, many unsophisticated employee investors hope to 
“strike it rich” by replicating in diminutive form the stock op-
tion holdings of their executive counterparts.129 Indeed, these 
two motivations tend to coalesce in what is commonly described 
as the “endorsement” effect. When employers direct their con-
tribution match in the form of company stock, studies show a 
correlative boost in participant company stock elections, pre-
sumably owing to the employer’s perceived endorsement or rec-
ommendation of company stock as a desirable investment 
choice.130 
A third factor contributing to the high incidence of com-
pany stock in defined contribution plans is the lack of legal con-
straints on the practice. While ERISA forbids defined benefit 
plans from investing more than 10% of plan assets in company 
stock or real estate, no similar limitation applies to defined 
contribution plans.131 In addition, ERISA exempts defined con-
tribution plans from its fiduciary diversification requirements 
with respect to participant-directed investment decisions.132 
 
 128. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 8–9. 
 129. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 102–06. Research indi-
cates that many employees myopically underestimate the risks associated 
with investments in company stock. See id.; Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 112, 
at 51. 
 130. See Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 
401(k) Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747, 1747–49 (2001); Mitchell & 
Utkus, The Role of Company Stock, supra note 112, at 24. 
 131. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2000) (providing an ERISA prohibi-
tion on defined benefit plans investing more than 10% of plan assets in com-
pany stock or real estate), with 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(1) (excluding defined con-
tribution plans from ERISA’s 10% prohibition). In part, this distinction is a 
historical accident. At the time of ERISA’s enactment, defined benefit plans 
were the dominant pension form, and 401(k) plans did not yet exist. Mitchell 
& Utkus, supra note 112, at 35–36. Congress adopted legislation authorizing 
401(k) plans in 1978. Id. at 36. The principal types of defined contribution re-
tirement plans in existence in 1974 were ESOP and profit-sharing plans, both 
of which were premised on, or at least compatible with, company stock owner-
ship and not surprisingly exempted from the 10% limitation. Even & 
Macpherson, supra note 111, at 305; Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 112, at 35–
36. 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c). See generally Andrew S. Hartley, Making the Case 
for Mandatory Removal of Imprudent Investment Vehicles: Inside Information 
Can Make Employer Securities a Bad 401(k) Option, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 99, 
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In sum, current regulations permit both employers and 
employees to overload defined contribution plans with company 
stock. The result, as demonstrated by Enron and other exam-
ples, is a particularly dangerous threat to retirement security. 
C. PERSONAL SAVINGS 
The third leg of the retirement stool also is in trouble. 
While personal savings represent an important potential cush-
ion against the declining fortunes of retirement programs spon-
sored by the government and employers, the current reality is 
that this leg is as wobbly as the other two. 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), a division of the 
U.S. Commerce Department, has been tracking personal sav-
ings data since 1929. The annual personal savings rate depicts 
the amount of disposable income that individuals do not expend 
in personal outlays over the course of a year.133 For most of the 
period from 1945 to 1985, the personal savings rate hovered in 
the range of 7 to 11%.134 But the rate has been falling precipi-
tously over the past twenty years. The personal savings rate 
was 10.8% in 1984, 4.8% in 1994, and 1.8% in 2004.135 For the 
first time since the Great Depression the rate declined to nega-
tive territory in 2005 (-0.5%) and 2006 (-1.0%).136 
How does a society manage to spend more than it makes? 
The short answer is by borrowing.137 During the first five years 
of the twenty-first century, consumer debt grew approximately 
twice as fast as personal income.138 In other words, savings ac-
 
110–11 (2006) (describing how ERISA and related regulations allow employers 
to avoid fiduciary liability for bad investment decisions by plan participants). 
 133. Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Per-
sonal Income and Outlays: March 2006 (May 1, 2006), at 1, 4 [hereinafter 
BEA, Personal Income and Outlays], available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/ 
newsrelarchive/2006/pi0306.pdf. 
 134. Table 2.1: Personal Income and Its Disposition, NAT’L INCOME & 
PRODUCT ACCT. TABLES (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, 
Wash., D.C.), http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Personal Income]; see also KEN MCDONNELL ET AL., 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENE-
FITS 71–73 (4th ed. 1997). 
 135. Personal Income, supra note 134; Kathleen Pender, Personal Saving 
Rate Drops to Zero Percent, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2005, at E1. 
 136. Personal Income, supra note 134; BEA, Personal Income and Outlays, 
supra note 133, at 1–4. 
 137. See Pender, supra note 135; BEA, Personal Income and Outlays, supra 
note 133, at 4.  
 138. Pender, supra note 135. 
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count credits are giving way to credit card and home equity 
loan debits. 
The decline in personal savings is troubling for a number of 
reasons. First, and most obvious, the lack of assets accumu-
lated from personal savings exacerbates the impact of looming 
shortfalls in Social Security and in employer-sponsored pension 
programs.139 Second, from a macroeconomic view, a decline in 
personal savings decreases the amount of capital available for 
business growth.140 And, as a corollary matter, the savings defi-
cit means that the U.S. economy increasingly depends on for-
eign sources to provide necessary capital investment.141 
Some critics take issue with the validity of the BEA data. 
They point out that the BEA’s measurement of personal sav-
ings does not include capital gains obtained through the owner-
ship of real estate or stock equity holdings.142 According to 
these critics, sizeable capital gains over the past decade have 
made personal savings less necessary as a source of retirement 
funding.143 
This argument, however, is valid only to a point. Even if 
the more volatile and less predictable prospect of capital gains 
is added to the personal resource reservoir,144 that mix of assets 
still falls far short of providing a desirable retirement safety 
net. Experts suggest that combined savings rates of 15% or 
higher are needed to augment other sources of retirement in-
come.145 But capital gains, even in the above average range of 
recent years, only bump up the overall savings rate by some-
where between 2 and 6%.146 And these gains tend to accrue 
 
 139. Jonathan Barry Forman, Universal Pensions, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 95, 95–
96 (1999); Moore & Mitchell, supra note 97, at 68. 
 140. See Pender, supra note 135. 
 141. Frank Shostak, Should We Worry About Falling Savings?, MISES 
DAILY ARTICLE (Ludwig von Mises Inst., Auburn, Ala.), Feb. 2006, available at 
http://www.mises.org/story/2067 (“Many experts are of the view that the fal-
ling savings rate points to a growing dependence on the inflow of foreign capi-
tal to keep the economy going.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Michael K. Evans, Less-Than-Zero Savings? Don’t Believe It, 
INDUSTRY WK., Dec. 2005, at 48, 48; Jonathan Clements, Forget the Rule of 
Thumb: Saving 10% of Your Salary Is No Longer Enough, WALL ST. J., July 
20, 2005, at D1. 
 143. Pender, supra note 135. 
 144. See id. (discussing how retirement security may be negatively affected 
if the “perfect scenario” of rising home and stock prices does not continue). 
 145. See Clements, supra note 142; Mary Beth Franklin, How Much Is 
ENOUGH?, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN., Feb. 2006, at 69, 70. 
 146. Satyendra Verma & Jules Lichtenstein, The Declining Personal Sav-
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primarily to top earners rather than to future retirees as a 
class.147 As BEA research economist Marshall Reinsdorf con-
cludes, the decline in the savings rate is “too big to explain 
away. . . . The overall conclusion, that people are saving less 
than they used to, doesn’t change.”148 
D. SUMMARY 
Each of the three legs of the retirement stool either cur-
rently falls short of contributing adequate financial resources 
for future retirees or threatens to do so in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Current trends presage that about 45% of all future baby 
boom retirees will fail to achieve the desired target of having 
enough post-retirement income to replace 75% of pre-
retirement earnings, and that figure has the potential to 
worsen significantly if scheduled Social Security benefits are 
not maintained.149 More disturbingly, the combination of in-
creased longevity and asset shortfalls suggests that more than 
half of all current workers will run out of retirement assets be-
fore they run out of retirement years.150 In short, the retire-
ment stool is an increasingly wobbly platform that threatens 
too many American workers with an insecure post-work finan-
cial future. 
II.  STRENGTHENING THE RETIREMENT SAFETY NET   
Because all three components of the retirement safety net 
are in trouble, Congress needs to take significant reform meas-
ures to provide broad-based financial security for the coming 
 
ing Rate: Is There Cause for Alarm?, AARP BRIEF (Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers., 
Wash., D.C.), March 2000, at 1, 4–5, available at http://aarp.org/research/ 
financial/retirementsaving/Articles/aresearch-import-381-IB42.html; 
Clements, supra note 142. 
 147. WELLER & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 28. 
 148. Clements, supra note 142. 
 149. Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Changing Impact of Social Security on 
Retirement Income in the United States, SOC. SEC. BULL., Jan. 2005, at 1, 6; 
see also Alicia H. Munnell et al., A New National Retirement Risk Index, AN 
ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), June 2006, at 1, 
3–4, http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/ib_48.pdf (finding that 43% of 
American households are at risk of having insufficient retirement income and 
projecting that income will fall 10% or more below target income replacement 
rates). 
 150. See Mark J. Warshawsky & John Ameriks, How Prepared Are Ameri-
cans for Retirement, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT 
WEALTH, supra note 97, at 33, 47 tbl.3; William G. Gale, Will the Baby Boom 
Be Ready for Retirement?, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1997, at 5, 5–9. 
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wave of retirees. This Part reviews the current array of reform 
proposals as well as some of the major provisions of the PPA. It 
then goes on to recommend an agenda for averting the poten-
tial perfect storm of retirement insecurity. 
A. SOCIAL SECURITY 
Social Security reform has been the subject of a long-
running and contentious debate. In his 2005 State of the Union 
address, President Bush declared that the Social Security sys-
tem was in crisis and proposed a systemic overhaul centered on 
the creation of personal retirement accounts.151 Under this 
plan, workers under the age of fifty-five would have the option 
to divert up to four percentage points of their payroll taxes (ap-
proximately one-third of the current combined employer and 
employee 12.4% assessment) to individual accounts that would 
pay benefits in exchange for accepting a reduced amount of 
traditionally funded Social Security benefits.152 President Bush 
suggested that workers could invest the retirement accounts in 
a limited mix of stock and bond funds and that those accounts 
could be centrally administered in a manner similar to the 
Thrift Savings Plan currently in place for federal employees.153 
According to a prepared summary of the President’s proposal, 
“[p]ersonal retirement accounts [would] give younger workers 
the chance to receive a higher rate of return from sound, long-
term investing of a portion of their payroll taxes than they re-
ceive under the current system.”154 The President’s proposal fa-
vors a curb on future benefit increases by tying such adjust-
ments to changes in prices rather than by continuing the more 
generous practice of wage-indexing.155 
Democrats generally have reacted negatively to the Presi-
dent’s proposal. Many Democrats deny both the existence of a 
crisis as well as the need for a systemic restructuring of the 
current Social Security system.156 Former representative Mar-
 
 151. See THE WHITE HOUSE, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 1–2, 5 (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ 
social-security/200501/strengthening-socialsecurity.html. 
 152. Id. at 5. 
 153. Id. at 6–7, 9–10. 
 154. Id. at 5. 
 155. See Robert C. Pozen, Why My Plan to Fix Social Security Will Work, 
USA TODAY, June 13, 2005, at A13. 
 156. See, e.g., Henry Bodget, A Market Fix for Social Security, EURO-
MONEY, Feb. 2005, at 32, 32; Murray Weidenbaum, The Never-Ending Di-
BEFORT_4FMT 4/13/2007 11:19:19 AM 
964 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:938 
 
tin Sabo (D-Minn.), for instance, critiqued the Bush plan as fol-
lows: “I am frustrated by the talk of ‘crisis.’ I believe it is an ef-
fort to deceive the American public into accepting massive 
changes that would destroy the life-long, guaranteed Social Se-
curity benefits that retirees have earned.”157 
Each political viewpoint contains a germ of truth. Presi-
dent Bush accurately depicts the looming depletion of the So-
cial Security trust accounts as a crisis. Unless Congress under-
takes remedial action, the Social Security system will be unable 
to pay out scheduled benefits, and a large segment of the re-
tired workforce will slip into poverty.158 This problem becomes 
more severe with each passing year that Congress fails to find 
a solution.159 
But, the President’s Democratic opponents also are correct 
in arguing that the proposal for personal retirement accounts 
fails to address the problem at hand—namely, that the Social 
Security system eventually will run out of funds to pay bene-
fits.160 Personal accounts would change how funds are held and 
invested, but by themselves would not increase revenue or de-
crease program costs.161 Further, even if the claim that equity 
holdings would generate more investment gains is accurate, 
that same effect could be captured by investing a portion of the 
combined trust funds in such holdings. Such a system-wide ap-
proach would avoid exposing individual retirees to dangerous 
investment volatility risks and increased administrative ac-
count-handling costs.162 
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the 
proposal for private retirement accounts. Such accounts would 
worsen the financial posture of the Social Security system be-
cause the President’s individual account initiative would re-
 
lemma over Medicare and Social Security, USA TODAY MAG., May 2006, at 12, 
15. 
 157. Martin Olav Sabo, Preserving Social Security Act of 2005 (H.R. 1123), 
http://sabo.house.gov (last visited Aug. 24, 2005) (on file with author). See gen-
erally Preserving the Social Security Act of 2005, H.R. 1123, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 158. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 159. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 20–21. 
 160. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 161. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 133–34. 
 162. Id. at 133–63; Aaron Bernstein et al., Social Security: Three New 
Ideas, BUS. WK., Feb. 21, 2005, at 54, 54–55; Randall P. Mariger, Social Secu-
rity Privatization: What Are the Issues? 29–34 (Technical Paper Series, Cong. 
Budget Office, No. 1999-8, 1999), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc 
.cfm?index=3113&type=1. 
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quire the Social Security system to finance two programs si-
multaneously for a lengthy transitional period. First, the trust 
funds would continue to pay benefits under the present pay-as-
you-go retirement system.163 Second, the Social Security system 
would pre-fund individual accounts for future benefit pay-
ments.164 While some analysts suggest that up to two trillion 
dollars in borrowing would be necessary to fund the private ac-
count plan,165 even the official summary of the President’s plan 
acknowledges a potential shortfall of $754 billion, or one-half of 
the current trust fund surplus, during the plan’s first decade of 
existence.166 Although the Social Security Trust Funds would 
recoup the overall outflow of funds in the subsequent seventy-
five years as account holders retire, the ensuing transitional 
deficit would hasten the Trust Funds’ exhaustion by about a 
decade.167 
If private retirement accounts are not the answer, what is 
the best solution for avoiding Social Security’s impending melt-
down? The good news is that a wide variety of options are 
available to correct Social Security’s imbalance without the 
need to resort to radical structural changes. The shortfall in 
Social Security finances over the next seventy-five years (the 
usual durational yardstick for measuring program solvency) 
amounts to 1.92% of payroll.168 Put simply, that means that a 
1.92% reduction in benefits or a corresponding increase in pay-
roll taxes (i.e., from 12.4% to 14.32%) would “solve” the Social 
Security crisis. A combination of benefit reductions and tax in-
creases that eliminate the 1.92% gap would have a similar ef-
fect. 
Analysts have suggested proposals for closing this gap. 
Among the more frequently mentioned options are the follow-
ing: 
● Increasing the payroll tax; 
● Increasing the portion of benefits subject to the income 
tax; 
● Raising the payroll tax ceiling for employees; 
 
 163. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 25. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 45; Bernstein et 
al., supra note 162, at 54. 
 166. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 151, at 8. 
 167. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 139–62. 
 168. 2005 TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP., supra note 12, at 3. 
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● Raising the retirement age; 
● Reducing benefit amounts; 
● Modifying the rules for indexing initial benefit amounts; 
● Reducing the size of the annual cost-of-living 
adjustment for benefits; 
● Investing a portion of the Trust Funds in the stock 
market; and 
● Creating a system of private accounts.169 
Although a myriad of solutions is possible, a combination of 
benefit and tax adjustments optimally should fill the gap. 
Structuring the solution solely through benefit reductions 
would unduly undercut Social Security’s critical social insur-
ance function at a time when retirement resources in general 
are challenged in all directions. On the other hand, a tax-only 
solution would further exacerbate the budgetary burden gener-
ated by escalating mandatory social welfare expenditures.170 
With these principles in mind, this Article recommends 
three reform proposals to eliminate the 1.92% deficit. While 
other possible approaches are worth considering, this combina-
tion of modifications would best preserve the integrity and vi-
ability of the current Social Security system. 
1. Raise the Retirement Age 
When Congress enacted the Social Security Act in the 
1930s, the average American life expectancy was sixty-three 
years.171 By 2002, that figure had increased to an average of 
seventy-seven years.172 Meanwhile, the average retirement age 
has dropped; a majority of American workers now file for re-
tirement benefits at age sixty-two.173 Taken together, these 
trends have transformed Social Security from a system that 
pays benefits to a minority of former workers for a relatively 
short span of a few years to a system that pays benefits to a 
majority of former workers for a period of one to several dec-
 
 169. See SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 27–37 (describing vari-
ous proposed options for reducing the projected Social Security actuarial im-
balance as well as the fiscal impact of these various options). 
 170. See Maya MacGuineas, Private Accounts: A Progressive Approach to 
Reforming Social Security, POLITIC, May 13, 2003, available at http://www 
.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2003/private_accounts. 
 171. Wyss, supra note 27. 
 172. Infoplease, supra note 28. 
 173. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 21; GRUBER & WISE, supra note 
35, at 16–18. 
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ades. In this context, a modest future increase in the Social Se-
curity retirement age would generate sizable cost savings with-
out undermining Social Security’s fundamental retirement in-
surance objectives. 
A recommendation of the Social Security Advisory Council 
(1994–96) provides the outline of such a proposal. A majority of 
the Council favored accelerating the increase of the full retire-
ment age to sixty-seven and then raising the retirement age in 
future years to keep pace with further increases in life expec-
tancy.174 Present law provides for phasing in an increase in the 
normal retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven for work-
ers born in 1960 or later.175 The Council’s recommendation to 
accelerate that increase, so as to be fully effective in 2011, for 
those workers born in 1949 or later, would eliminate 7% of the 
seventy-five-year deficit.176 The Council also recommended in-
dexing both the normal and initial retirement ages thereafter 
to coincide with future increases in life expectancy.177 These 
two modifications would eliminate 43% of the deficit (or .83% of 
the payroll tax shortfall) over the seventy-five-year measuring 
period,178 and could complement measures to increase the re-
tirement age to sixty-seven. 
2. Implement After-Tax Indexing 
The Social Security program calculates benefit levels on 
the basis of an individual worker’s past earnings.179 Under cur-
rent practice, “wage-indexing” adjusts these earnings to reflect 
the value of past earnings in terms of present wage levels.180 
Since wages tend to rise faster than the rate of inflation, some 
critics view wage-indexing as an overly generous practice.181 
Indexing benefits to changes in prices, which generally in-
crease at a slower rate than wages, is a frequently discussed al-
 
 174. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 1 REPORT OF THE 1994–1996 ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 20–21 (1997). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 176. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 29. 
 177. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 174, at 20–21. 
 178. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 29–30. 
 179. See id. at 8 (“The portion of a worker’s earnings that are replaced by 
Social Security varies according to the worker’s wage level.”). 
 180. See Alicia H. Munnell & Mauricio Soto, What Does Price Indexing 
Mean for Social Security Benefits?, JUST THE FACTS ON RETIREMENT ISSUES 
(Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College, Boston, Mass.), Jan. 2005, at 1, 2. 
 181. Pozen, supra note 155 (discussing the merits of alternative progressive 
indexing). 
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ternative. The Bush reform agenda includes a call for “progres-
sive price indexing” by which the Social Security program 
would continue to index the benefits of the lowest 30% of wage 
earners on the basis of wages, while the program would index 
the benefits to prices for high earners or to a mix of prices and 
wages for middle earners.182 While this proposal would be con-
sistent with the traditionally progressive nature of Social Secu-
rity benefits, many commentators have strongly criticized it as 
making too deep a cut in benefits.183 A middle wage earner at 
retirement age would receive an immediate 9% reduction in 
benefits under the progressive price indexing formula.184 These 
reductions would compound over time, amounting to a 22% re-
duction in benefits by 2055,185 and an approximate 50% drop by 
2080.186 
Indexing benefit levels to after-tax wages is a preferable 
approach. Most economists expect the tax burden on workers to 
rise in future years as the baby boom generation retires and 
budgetary pressures increase.187 Some studies predict that the 
increase in after-tax wages will be roughly 0.2 to 0.3 percentage 
points per year less than the increase in pretax wages.188 After-
tax wages also more accurately reflect the true purchasing 
power of workers than do pre-tax wages.189 A shift to after-tax 
indexing would provide a gentler curb on future benefit growth 
while positively affecting the seventy-five-year trust fund defi-
cit.190 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Munnell & Soto, supra note 180, at 2–4; Thomas N. Bethell, 
Future Shock: Is the Latest Social Security Proposal for Indexing Benefits 
“Progressive” or a Body Blow to the Middle Class?, AARP BULL. (Am. Ass’n of 
Retired Pers., Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2005, at 8–9; JASON FURMAN ET AL., CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, WHY THE PRESIDENT’S SOCIAL SECURITY PRO-
POSALS COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE UNRAVELING OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
1–6 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/5-2-05socsec2.pdf. 
 184. Joint Econ. Comm. Democrats, What If President Bush’s Plan for Cuts 
in Social Security Benefits Were Already in Place?, ECON. POL’Y BRIEF, May 
2005, at 1, 3. 
 185. William E. Spriggs & David Ratner, Social Security Price Indexing 
Proposal Means Benefit Cuts for Workers, EPI ISSUE BRIEF (Econ. Policy Inst., 
Wash., D.C.), June 1, 2005, at 1, http://www.epinet.org/issuebriefs/209/ib209 
.pdf. 
 186. Bernstein et al., supra note 162, at 56. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 29, 35; Bernstein et al., su-
pra note 162, at 56 (“As a result, initial retiree benefits, which today are 
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3. Raise the Payroll Tax Ceiling 
The final proposed Social Security reform implicates the 
revenue side of the ledger. Raising the payroll tax would be the 
most direct way to raise additional revenue. A boost of the cur-
rent 12.4% tax to 13.2%, which would entail an additional 0.4% 
contribution by both employers and employees, would eliminate 
the remainder of the seventy-five-year shortfall.191 
Nonetheless, a different approach is preferable. In 1983, 
the Greenspan Commission set the maximum taxable earnings 
base for the Social Security payroll tax at a figure that covered 
90% of national income from work-related earnings.192 The cur-
rent ceiling is $90,000, meaning that individual earnings that 
exceed that amount are not subject to the payroll tax.193 This 
ceiling also is wage-indexed and increases each year.194 Over 
time, however, the percentage of earnings captured by the ceil-
ing has dropped to around 85% of national earnings and is pro-
jected to fall to 83% by 2014.195 Phasing in increases in the ceil-
ing to restore the 90% benchmark would generate enough 
revenue to reduce the seventy-five-year period deficit by ap-
proximately 40%.196 This solution is preferable to the 0.8% 
across-the-board option because it avoids an overall increase in 
the payroll tax and responds to growing income inequality by 
extending a previously determined contribution arrangement 
for taxpayers with the greatest ability to pay. 
4. Summary 
The three reform proposals described above close the 1.92% 
gap and avert Social Security’s oncoming fiscal crisis. The fol-
lowing chart197 depicts the relative contributions of each pro-
posal: 
 
linked to pretax wages, will probably significantly outpace the living stan-
dards of workers, who depend on after tax wages.”). 
 191. See SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 31, 36. 
 192. DIAMOND & ORSZAG, supra note 16, at 56, 84; Dean Baker & David 
Rosnick, Basic Facts on Social Security and Proposed Benefit 
Cuts/Privatization, (Ctr. for Econ. & Pol’y Research, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2005, 
at 6, http://www/cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=450. 
 193. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 11, at 11, 14. 
 194. Id. at 14. 
 195. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., supra note 17, at 31. 
 196. Bethell, supra note 183; Baker & Rosnick, supra note 192, at 6. 
 197. See supra notes 171–96 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1: Three Social Security Proposals 
Proposals  As Percent of  As Percent of  
  Taxable Payroll 1.92% Deficit 
Raise Retirement Age 0.83  43 
After-Tax Indexing 0.47  21 
Raise Payroll Tax Ceiling 0.83  43 
 Totals: 2.13  107 
 
Although perhaps less important than the bottom line, an-
other aspect of this analysis bears mention. A striking attribute 
of these proposals is their relative modesty. They do not entail 
a systemic modification to the structure of the Social Security 
system. They require, instead, only very minor adjustments to 
existing obligations and benefits. In short, the Social Security 
financial crisis, although real, would not be difficult to remedy 
if only we could find the political will to accomplish the task. 
B. PENSIONS 
Fixing the pension leg of the retirement stool presents a 
more difficult task. The problems plaguing the highly technical 
realm of pension plans are more diverse and more nuanced 
than the actuarial issues at play with respect to Social Secu-
rity. In addition, the voluntary nature of pensions is less ame-
nable to reform through command and control regulation. Fi-
nally, any examination of the U.S. pension system must include 
a look at the complex provisions of the new PPA. 
This section will first identify the necessary ingredients of 
a pension reform agenda in the contexts of defined benefit and 
defined contributions plans, respectively. Within these two sub-
sections, the analysis will then review and critique how the 
PPA addresses this agenda and offer some additional recom-
mendations for reform. 
1. Fulfilling Defined Benefit Plan Promises 
The past twenty-five years have not been kind to defined 
benefit pension plans and their beneficiaries. As plans have 
been weakened by under-funding and buffeted by volatile mar-
kets, a growing number of plan sponsors have defaulted on 
their defined benefit obligations.198 Other plan sponsors have 
frozen their defined benefit plans and substituted less generous 
 
 198. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
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cash balance plan arrangements.199 Too often, these conver-
sions have been crafted with a substantial “wearaway” of bene-
fit expectations for workers with long tenure.200 Reform meas-
ures are needed to better ensure that employers carry out the 
retirement security promises made to their employees. 
a. Require Adequate Funding 
Plan terminations often correlate with inadequately 
funded plans.201 Even when that correlation is lacking, the ter-
mination of inadequately funded plans results in a frustration 
of retirement benefit expectations. Defined benefit plans in the 
United States are currently underfunded by approximately 
$450 billion;202 significant steps are needed to ensure that plan 
sponsors make sufficient contributions to satisfy future liabili-
ties. 
To shore up the current funding deficit, policy-makers 
must address three primary issues. First, an accurate actuarial 
measure of a fund’s assets and liabilities is a necessary precon-
dition to gauging funding adequacy.203 One way to enhance the 
accuracy of this measurement is to reduce the degree of discre-
tion that plan sponsors can exercise in making interest rate as-
sumptions. Under current regulations, plan sponsors have an 
incentive to assume rates that maximize projected asset accu-
mulations.204 Such projections are prone to overstate the 
amount of available assets and thereby mask likely funding 
shortfalls.205 
As a second funding issue, defined benefit plan sponsors 
should be required to meet a more stringent minimum funding 
obligation. Sponsors at present generally are required to meet a 
90% funding level benchmark.206 This standard, along with 
various accounting exceptions, too often enables plan sponsors 
 
 199. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Teresa Ghilarducci, Professor of Economics, Notre Dame, Future 
Retirement Income Security Needs Defined Benefit Pensions 22 (Mar. 2006); 
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/defined_benefit_layout.pdf. 
 202. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 357; Simon, supra note 76, at 86. 
 203. See Ford et al., supra note 76, at 385; Fabozzi & Ryan, supra note 81, 
at 57–58. 
 204. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 205. Ford et al., supra note 76, at 360–74; Fabozzi & Ryan, supra note 81, 
at 54–55. 
 206. See Kerstein, supra note 69, at 5. 
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to withhold contributions, even to seriously underfunded 
plans.207 
Finally, the current credit balance rules contribute to plan 
underfunding. These rules enable plan sponsors to replace cash 
contributions with credit balances accrued in previous years, 
even if the plan in question is significantly underfunded.208 
Congress should prevent the Bethlehem Steel type of pension 
plan collapse by restricting the use of accounting credit bal-
ances for underfunded plans. 
For the most part, the PPA does a good job of addressing 
these benchmark funding concerns. The PPA is the successor to 
various legislative proposals that have kicked around Congress 
since 2002. While members of both political parties introduced 
a considerable amount of pension legislation during this period, 
sharp partisan divisions in Congress stymied any decisive ac-
tion.209 In 2006, however, the prospect of several major airlines 
terminating their pension plans made some type of pension leg-
islation a “must-pass” objective.210 In this climate, a conference 
committee hammered out a complicated 907-page bill that in-
corporated a series of practical and largely beneficial re-
forms.211 
The PPA implements three major changes with respect to 
the funding issue: 
● Requiring employers to make sufficient contributions to 
defined benefit plans in order to meet a 100% funding 
target over a seven year period; 
● Requiring employers to use a segmented interest rate 
 
 207. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 209. The House of Representatives, for example, twice passed Representa-
tive Boehner’s Pension Security Act proposal. H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. (2003). 
But this bill died in the Senate without a vote. See CHOI ET AL., supra note 
105, at 3 n.1. 
 210. Sheila R. Cherry, Senate Passes Pension Overhaul Bill with Promise to 
Re-Visit Airline Provisions, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 7, 2006, at AA-2. The PPA 
contains a special exemption giving certain airlines up to an additional ten 
years to meet funding obligations. See H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 
109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 4) 
(Comm. Print 2006). 
 211. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 and 26 U.S.C.); Press Release, House 
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, McKeon Hails Passage of Sweeping Re-
forms to Worker Pension Laws (July 28, 2006), available at http://edworkforce 
.house.gov/press/press109/second/07jul/pension072906.htm. 
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yield curve based upon long-term investment-grade 
corporate bonds and the retirement age dispersion of a 
fund’s beneficiaries in order to measure future pension 
liabilities; and 
● Prohibiting employers from using credit balances in lieu 
of contributions for plans funded at less than 80% of full 
funding status.212 
These three measures, in short, address each of the three 
benchmark issues identified above. Of course, the devil may be 
in the details of these highly technical provisions. Further, the 
bar restricting the use of accounting credit balances in lieu of 
actual contributions may be better set at a 90% rather than at 
an 80% funding level. Such an approach would more strongly 
redress the chronic problem of sponsors skirting the AFC re-
quirements for underfunded plans.213 Nonetheless, these three 
amendments demonstrate a practical and generally positive re-
sponse to the problem of pension plan underfunding. 
b. Preserving Benefits in Plan Conversions 
A second crucial goal is to ensure that workers’ expecta-
tions in defined benefit plans are not unduly trammeled in con-
versions to cash balance plans. The proper legal status of cash 
balance conversions has been a subject of considerable debate. 
Some scholars find most cash balance conversions to be illegal 
under ERISA’s age discrimination prohibition because their 
uniform accrual methodology generally results in a retirement 
age annuity value that declines with age.214 Other scholars 
view cash balance plans as lawful so long as the plans do not 
decrease present accrual levels on the basis of age.215 The fed-
eral courts similarly are split on this issue.216 
 
 212. Pension Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4, 109th Cong. §§ 101–116 (2006) 
(outlining the funding rules for single-employer defined benefit pension plans); 
id. §§ 301–303 (detailing interest rate assumptions); see also H. COMM. ON 
EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION 
PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 213. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 214. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 65, at 733–48. 
 215. See, e.g., Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 414–25. 
 216. Compare Cooper v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 
2d 1010, 1015–17 (S.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that a cash balance plan in which a 
participant’s rate of benefit accrual decreases on account of age violates ER-
ISA), with Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 834–37 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(finding age was not an express condition of a cash balance plan and uphold-
ing the plan under ERISA). 
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Numerous legislative proposals have been advanced to ad-
dress this uncertain landscape. Some of these proposals essen-
tially would prohibit or significantly penalize cash balance con-
versions. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), 
for example, supported legislation that would require an em-
ployer to permit a worker who is at least forty years old or has 
ten years of service to choose continued defined benefit cover-
age following an attempted conversion.217 Representative Ber-
nard Sanders, as an alternative, introduced a bill calling for a 
50% excise tax on any asset surplus in a converting defined 
benefit plan.218 Proposals such as these go too far because they 
are premised on the assumption that cash balance plans are 
inherently bad. They are not. Although officially a variant of a 
defined benefit plan,219 a cash balance plan essentially operates 
in a fashion similar to a defined contribution plan by periodi-
cally accumulating benefits in a hypothetical retirement ac-
count.220 Studies show that a majority of workers accrue equal 
or greater benefits under a cash balance plan as compared to a 
defined benefit plan if those plans are funded at an equivalent 
level.221 And, like defined contribution plans, cash balance 
plans are relatively portable and arguably more in tune with 
today’s mobile workforce.222 Moreover, cash balance plans pro-
vide greater retirement security than defined contribution 
plans because sponsoring employers (rather than employees) 
bear the risk of investment loss and because the PBGC pro-
vides partial replacement coverage in the event of plan termi-
nation.223 
 
 217. Certner, supra note 94, at 10. 
 218. S. 1640, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2902, 106th Cong. (1999); Colleen T. 
Congel, Cash Balance Plans: Rep. Sanders Drafting Bill to Target Employers 
Converting to Cash Balance Plans, 26 PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 2107, 2107 
(1999). 
 219. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 220. Forman & Nixon, supra note 88, at 387; Elliott & Moore, supra note 
63, at 1–2. 
 221. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 7; Clark & Schieber, 
supra note 49, at 16–19. Many employers, however, fund cash balance conver-
sion plans at a lower level than the predecessor defined benefit plan. See supra 
notes 88–94 and accompanying text. A study conducted by the Government 
Accountability Office reported that a “comparison of a typical [defined benefit] 
FAP plan that is converted to a typical CB [cash benefit] plan finds that, re-
gardless of a worker’s age, more workers would have received greater benefits 
under the FAP than under the typical CB plan.” GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, supra note 66, at 6. 
 222. Zelinsky, supra note 65, at 731–32. 
 223. Elliott & Moore, supra note 63, at 4. 
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The crucial problem is not with cash balance conversions 
per se, but with those conversions that use wear-away periods 
that unduly undercut the legitimate reliance expectations of 
long-term employees.224 These workers not only lose the antici-
pated defined benefit backloading effect of increased benefit ac-
cruals during the last few years preceding retirement, but they 
also experience a period in which they, unlike their junior col-
leagues, enjoy no benefit accrual at all under the new cash bal-
ance plan.225 Accordingly, proposals at the opposite extreme, 
such as the 2005 version of the PPA which would have provided 
a safe harbor to the wear-away practice in cash balance conver-
sions, also are objectionable.226 
The PPA adopts a middling approach to the cash balance 
conversion issue by enacting two principal reforms. First, the 
Act removes the legal uncertainty surrounding cash balance 
plans by deeming such plans prospectively nondiscriminatory 
as to age if older workers earn current benefits at least equal to 
younger workers (even though younger workers may receive 
such amounts over a longer period of time).227 Second, the Act 
prohibits the practice of imposing a wear-away period following 
a plan conversion.228 Thus, the 2006 measure strikes a balance 
by permitting employers to switch to a cash balance formula, 
while prohibiting them from denying benefit accruals to older 
workers pursuant to that formula following plan conversion. 
Put another way, the 2006 Act permits a cash balance conver-
sion to be accompanied with a maximum of “one whammy.”229 
Although some groups have criticized the 2006 Act for not 
including additional transition assistance for workers hurt by 
cash balance conversions,230 the Pension Protection Act strikes 
 
 224. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 226. See H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. (2005); H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORK-
FORCE, 109TH CONG., PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 (H.R. 2830): 
STRENGTHENING RETIREMENT SECURITY, PROTECTING TAXPAYERS BY FIXING 
OUTDATED PENSION LAWS 5–6 (Comm. Print 2006), available at http://www 
.house.gov/ed_workforce/issues/109th/workforce/pension/ppasummarylong 
.htm. 
 227. H.R. 4, 109th Cong. § 701 (2006).  
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the “double 
whammy” previously associated with cash balance plans). 
 230. Bill Novelli, American Association of Retired Persons, Statement of 
Bill Novelli Regarding the Pension Protection Act (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www 
.aarp.org/research/presscenter/presscurrentnews/pension_protection_act.1 
.html; Press Release, Pension Rights Ctr., Pension Bill a Huge Missed Oppor-
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an acceptable compromise by means of the wear-away ban. The 
bigger concern is that the combination of more rigorous defined 
benefit funding rules along with loosened cash balance conver-
sion standards will further hasten the demise of traditional de-
fined benefit plans. These two changes will likely act as twin 
incentives for still more employers to terminate or freeze their 
defined benefit plans.231 
2. Encouraging and Protecting Defined Contribution Plan 
Participation 
a. Altering the Default Options for Participation 
Defined contribution plans, most notably employer-
sponsored 401(k) plans, implicate a different set of problems. 
Here, the issue is not one of funding since defined contribution 
plans, by definition, are fully funded on an ongoing basis.232 
The most significant problem, instead, is the low rate of em-
ployee participation, with approximately one-fourth to one-
third of all those employees offered a defined contribution plan 
failing to participate.233 
As the prevalence of defined contribution plans has in-
creased in the United States, so too has the degree of personal 
responsibility for employees to manage their own retirement 
resources.234 But individual financial planning is not a simple 
task. Many employees, faced with application forms and a diz-
zying array of investment options, simply procrastinate and do 
nothing. The complexity of the financial planning task, in other 
words, results in “bounded rationality” and a sub-optimal proc-
ess of retirement planning.235 
 
tunity for Retirement Security (Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www 
.pensionrights.org/news/press/HR-4-final-passage-August-4-2006.html. 
 231. See Sheila R. Cherry, Pension Reform Administration, Industry Reacts 
to H.R. 4 as Provisions Head for Vote in Senate, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, 
Aug. 3, 2006 (reporting on an interview with Professor Teresa Ghilarducci, 
who criticized the PPA by calling it “a disguise for a further exit out of the de-
fined benefit system”); Jane Bryant Quinn, A Requiem for Pensions, NEWS-
WEEK, July 3, 2006, at 53, 53 (describing the 2006 Act as a strange reform that 
will “push many more companies into freezing or dropping their plans”). 
 232. Reece, supra note 48, at 80. 
 233. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 234. William G. Gale et al., The Automatic 401(k): A Simple Way to 
Strengthen Retirement Savings (Ret. Sec. Project, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 
1, available at http://brookings.edu/views/papers/20050228_401k.pdf. 
 235. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 172–74; Madrian & Shea, su-
pra note 96, at 1176–84; Gale et al., supra note 234, at 3. 
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Since the problem here essentially is a matter of inertia, 
reversing the pull of inertia offers an intriguing possible solu-
tion. Rather than putting the onus on individual employees to 
undertake the steps necessary to opt into an offered 401(k) 
plan, why not provide for the automatic enrollment of a covered 
employee unless he or she opts out of the plan? 
Several studies support the efficacy of an automatic en-
rollment strategy. In 1998, the Treasury Department issued a 
revenue ruling authorizing an employer’s voluntary adoption of 
an automatic enrollment policy.236 Three years later, Brigette 
Madrian and Dennis Shea published a paper analyzing the im-
pact of a large corporation’s implementation of an automatic 
enrollment policy.237 Before the plan change, employees par-
ticipated in the company’s 401(k) plan only if they affirmatively 
elected to do so. Following the plan change, the company auto-
matically enrolled new employees in the plan unless they made 
a negative election to opt out of the plan. Although none of the 
economic features of the plan changed, the switch to automatic 
enrollment increased plan participation by 25%.238 Other stud-
ies similarly indicate that automatic enrollment can boost the 
rate of plan participation from a national average of around 
75% to between 85 and 95%.239 Automatic enrollment is par-
ticularly effective in raising the participation rates of previ-
ously under-participating groups such as younger workers and 
low-wage workers.240 
The PPA embraces this strategy by encouraging employers 
to enroll employees automatically in defined contribution plans 
subject to the right of employees to opt out of such participa-
tion.241 The PPA also encourages employees strongly by provid-
 
 236. Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-25 I.R.B. 8. 
 237. Madrian & Shea, supra note 96, at 1149–50. 
 238. Id. at 1173; see also John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default 
Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 6–
7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12009, 2006), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w1209 (reporting on another study showing a 
similar 25% participation gain). 
 239. James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Par-
ticipant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 67, 
76–77 (2002); Howard Gleckman, A Nest Egg That’s a No-Brainer, BUS. WK., 
Apr. 25, 2005, at 108, 108–10. 
 240. Madrian & Shea, supra note 96, at 1176–79. 
 241. H.R. 4, 109th Cong. §§ 624, 902 (2006); H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE 
WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 (H.R. 2830): 
STRENGTHENING RETIREMENT SECURITY, PROTECTING TAXPAYERS BY FIXING 
OUTDATED PENSION LAWS 9 (Comm. Print 2006), available at http://www 
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ing a safe harbor from nondiscrimination and fiduciary re-
quirements for employers that adopt the reverse default option 
practice.242 
While the Act removes potential obstacles to default en-
rollment, it remains to be seen how many employers will volun-
tarily embrace this option. Some employers that make match-
ing contributions on behalf of participating employees may 
decide against the automatic enrollment option because of its 
greater cost. Ultimately, Congress should monitor employer 
participation rates to determine whether an automatic enroll-
ment mandate would be preferable. 
Congress should consider adopting default options for some 
other 401(k) decisions as well. Madrian and Shea’s study found 
that, even with automatic enrollment, inertia tended to stag-
nate contribution levels and investment allocations in accor-
dance with the initial enrollment default parameters.243 Fur-
ther, a majority of employees with smaller account balances 
cash in their plans when changing jobs rather than rolling 
them over into a new or ongoing plan.244 These tendencies, of 
course, depress the overall accumulation of retirement sav-
ings.245 Like initial enrollment, there is reason to believe that 
these negative inclinations could be dampened if plans pro-
vided automatically for periodic increases in contributions, de-
fault investment allocations (such as life-cycle funds), and the 
default rollover of plan funds upon job change.246 While em-
ployees should have the right to override each of these settings, 
these new default options would harness the powerful force of 
inertia for greater retirement savings. 
 
.house.gov/ed_workforce/issues/109th/workforce/pension/ppasummarylong 
.htm. 
 242. H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., PENSION PRO-
TECTION ACT OF 2006 (H.R. 2830): STRENGTHENING RETIREMENT SECURITY, 
PROTECTING TAXPAYERS BY FIXING OUTDATED PENSION LAWS 9 (Comm. Print 
2006), available at http://www.house.gov/ed_workforce/issues/109th/workforce/ 
pension/ppasummarylong.htm. 
 243. Madrian & Shea, supra note 96, at 1171–76; see also Beshears et al., 
supra note 238, at 8–12. 
 244. Walczak & Dunham, supra note 99, at 32. 
 245. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 28–40, 125–42 (estimating 
that employees amass assets in defined contribution plans at only about one-
fourth the rate that would be anticipated, primarily due to asset “leakages” 
attributable to job change distributions and non-repaid loans). 
 246. Id. at 174–76; Gale et al., supra note 234, at 4–5, 8–10; see also Bes-
hears et al., supra note 238, at 16–26 (describing in general the significant im-
pact that default options have on retirement savings outcomes). 
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b. Diversifying Defined Contribution Plan Investments 
Following the 2001 Enron collapse, legislators have intro-
duced numerous bills in Congress to address the issue of com-
pany stock concentrations in defined contribution plans. But, 
until the passage of the PPA, Congress was unable to forge a 
consensus solution. 
The most far-reaching of these reform proposals was the 
proposed Pension Protection and Diversification Act sponsored 
by Senators Boxer (D-Cal.) and Corzine (D-N.J.). This bill 
would have capped company stock holdings at 20% of an indi-
vidual’s 401(k) holdings and enabled employees to sell company 
matching stock ninety days after receipt.247 The bill also would 
have limited the tax deduction available to employers who 
make matching contributions in company stock to 50% of the 
value of that stock.248 
But many critics, including President Bush, oppose placing 
limits of this type on an employer’s ability to make matching 
contributions in the form of company stock.249 A principal objec-
tion is one of deterrence. As the argument goes, employers who 
are precluded from making company stock matching contribu-
tions will respond by not making any matching contributions or 
by not sponsoring any pension plan at all.250 
Most congressional proposals have steered clear of an ex-
plicit limitation on company stock holdings in favor of alterna-
tives that would encourage education and enable employee di-
versification.251 The most prominent of these proposals was the 
Pension Security Act of 2003 sponsored by Representative 
Boehner (R-Ohio).252 This bill would have permitted plan par-
ticipants to diversify out of company stock matching contribu-
tions after three years and would have permitted “fiduciary ad-
visors” to offer investment advice to participants.253 These 
advisors would have included interested pension managers and 
investors, so long as conflicts of interest were disclosed.254 
 
 247. S. 1838, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 42, 48–49; Stabile, supra note 113, 
at 557–58. 
 250. Lawrence, supra note 104, at 48–49. 
 251. See Iwry, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
 252. H.R. 1000, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 253. Id. §§ 104(j)(3)(A), 105(g). 
 254. Id. § 105(g)(1)(B). The Pension Security Act proposal passed the House 
of Representatives in both 2002 and 2003. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 3. 
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Congressional Democrats also have moved away from the 
explicit cap approach of the Boxer/Corzine bill. Those sponsors 
withdrew their bill in 2003 in favor of one introduced by Sena-
tor Kennedy (D-Mass.).255 Kennedy’s bill created an “either/or” 
option, permitting employers to contribute stock to 401(k) plans 
or to offer stock as an investment option to plan participants, 
but not both.256 The bill also would have enabled employees to 
sell company matching stock after a maximum three-year hold-
ing period.257 
These legislative proposals reflect a difficult set of compet-
ing policy choices. On the one hand, over-concentration of com-
pany stock in pension portfolios poses significant dangers to re-
tirement security. On the other hand, a prohibition on an 
employee’s voluntary choice to invest in his or her employer’s 
stock smacks of paternalism.258 
The anti-paternalism concern won out in Congress. The 
PPA, also sponsored by Representative Boehner, essentially 
carries forward the diversification and education components of 
the earlier Pension Security Act proposal. The PPA enables 
plan participants to sell any employer-directed company stock 
match at any time beyond three years of receipt.259 It also pro-
vides a safe harbor for fiduciary advisors, including interested 
financial service firms, who give advice to participants on port-
folio management, so long as they disclose conflicts and base 
advice upon an independently approved computer model.260 
The PPA’s response to the problem of company stock over-
concentration warrants lower marks. Considerable research 
suggests that participant education and empowerment are 
unlikely to lead to diversification.261 Many participants are 
less-than-savvy investors who tend to think that company stock 
 
The Senate did not vote on the bill in either year. Id. 
 255. Senator Ted Kennedy et al., Press Conference on Retirement Security 
Legislation (Mar. 6, 2002). 
 256. S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 101 (2002). 
 257. Id. § 102(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 258. See generally CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 23–24 (discussing how 
these competing policies create a “policymaking muddle”). 
 259. H.R. 4, 109th Cong. § 901 (2006) (enacted); H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE 
WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT 
(H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 260.  H.R. 4, 109th Cong. §§ 601–25 (2006) (enacted); H. COMM. ON EDUC. 
& THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTEC-
TION ACT (H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 261. See Stabile, supra note 113, at 552–57; Iwry, supra note 102, at 3–4. 
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concentrations are a problem for others, but not themselves.262 
As an example, the widespread media attention given to the 
Enron collapse, coupled with a voluntary loosening of diversifi-
cation restrictions by some employers, has had a negligible im-
pact on the prevalence of company stock concentrations.263 
The provision authorizing investment advice by interested 
advisors also is problematic. This safe harbor measure runs 
counter to ERISA’s general prohibited transaction rules that 
bar parties with conflicts of interest from exercising fiduciary 
responsibilities.264 The provision of investment advice by enti-
ties that may gain from an employee’s continued investment in 
company stock is a puzzling way to foster diversification. As 
Professor Stabile commented with respect to the proposed Pen-
sion Security Act, “[i]f the only advice available is conflicted 
advice, participants will either take that conflicted advice or be 
no better off than they are now.”265 
Here again, a change in default options may provide a bet-
ter solution. Some commentators have suggested requiring 
plans to structure default employee investment options in a di-
verse portfolio that does not contain company stock.266 Employ-
ees could override the default option and change the invest-
ment mix to include company stock if it is offered by the plan as 
an investment option.267 Under this approach, employees could 
consciously choose to invest in company stock, but the impact of 
inertia, a definite force in determining investment allocations, 
would work in favor of diversification.268 Meanwhile, employers 
 
 262. See also JOHN HANCOCK FIN. SERVS., EIGHTH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLAN SURVEY: INSIGHT INTO PARTICIPANT INVESTMENT KNOWLEDGE & BE-
HAVIOR 10 (2002), available at http://www.reig.jhancock.com/gsfp/survey2002 
.pdf (reporting on survey results showing that 401(k) plan participants on av-
erage rate company stock as a less risky investment than a diversified equity 
mutual fund). 
 263. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 23–24 (estimating that the media pub-
licity surrounding the bankruptcy of Enron and other firms “reduced the frac-
tion of 401(k) assets held in employer stock by at most 2 percentage points”); 
see also Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Research Shows U.S. Em-
ployees Not Interacting with 401(k) Plan for Optimal Benefit (July 8, 2002) (on 
file with author) (reporting on a study showing that in 2001, the year of En-
ron’s collapse, “only 19.5% of active 401(k) participants made any form of 
trade” in their account). 
 264. See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 66–67. 
 265. Stabile, supra note 113, at 557. 
 266. CHOI ET AL., supra note 105, at 24–25; Iwry, supra note 102, at 5. 
 267. Iwry, supra note 102, at 5. 
 268. Id.; see also Stabile, supra note 113, at 554 (“[Sixty percent] of partici-
pants in 401(k) plans never make any changes to their initial contribution and 
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could still choose to make matching contributions in company 
stock, but participants would have the ability to diversify the 
match within a relatively short time. 
C. ENCOURAGING SAVINGS BY LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
EARNERS 
As a final matter, U.S. workers should be encouraged to in-
crease savings for retirement. Because defined benefit plans 
are crumbling and Social Security’s future is increasingly un-
certain, it is more important than ever for workers to supple-
ment these external sources with individually financed retire-
ment investments.269 Many vehicles are available to assist in 
this endeavor, including employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, In-
dividual Retirement Accounts, and personal savings accounts. 
Yet current data depict a widespread pattern of sub-optimal in-
vestment in each of these various forms.270 
U.S. policy currently encourages savings through a variety 
of tax preferences. Employees, for example, may defer income 
tax liability on contributions of up to $15,000 per year made to 
a qualifying 401(k) plan.271 These contributions, as well as em-
ployer contributions to the plan, are excluded from the em-
ployee’s current taxable income until the employee subse-
quently withdraws them as retirement income.272 Employers 
also may deduct their contributions as ordinary business ex-
penses.273 In a similar vein, individuals may reduce current 
taxable income by up to $5000 per year by the year 2008 for 
each dollar contributed to an Individual Retirement Account.274 
Alternatively, individuals may use a Roth IRA from which they 
may withdraw investment growth at retirement without tax li-
 
investment decisions.”). 
 269. See supra notes 36–42, 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 125–36 and accompanying text. 
 271. I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(B) (West 2006); see also MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra 
note 45, at 183–89 (summarizing the regulatory framework and tax treatment 
of contributions made to 401(k), IRA, and other defined contribution pension 
plan arrangements); PETER ORSZAG & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, TOWARD PRO-
GRESSIVE PENSIONS: A SUMMARY OF THE U.S. PENSION SYSTEM AND PROPOS-
ALS FOR REFORM 14–17 (2001), http://www.sbgo.com/Papers/csdconf.pdf (dis-
cussing the benefits of progressive pension policy as it relates to tax incentives 
and preferences). 
 272. I.R.C. § 402(a). 
 273. Id. § 404(a). 
 274. Id. §§ 219, 408. 
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ability.275 Altogether, these various tax preferences reduce the 
present value of tax revenues by approximately $150 billion 
each year.276 
This preferential tax treatment, however, is problematic on 
grounds of both equity and efficacy. In terms of equity, a dis-
proportionate share of tax savings flows to high-income earners 
even though it is low- and middle-income earners who are most 
in danger of having inadequate funds available upon retire-
ment.277 This fact is illustrated by comparing the tax conse-
quences to a high-income earner and a low-income earner mak-
ing a 401(k) contribution of the same amount. A $100 
contribution by a high-income earner in the 35% marginal fed-
eral income tax bracket receives a $35 exclusion, resulting in a 
$65 after-tax cost to the taxpayer. The same contribution by a 
low-income earner in the 15% marginal tax bracket, in con-
trast, receives only a $15 exclusion, resulting in an $85 after-
tax cost. The deduction, accordingly, is worth more than twice 
as much to the high-income earner.278 In total, two-thirds of the 
existing savings tax preferences currently go to the highest 
20% of income earners.279 
In terms of efficacy, tax subsidies are poorly targeted as a 
strategy for boosting overall savings. High-income households 
have a higher propensity (and ability) to save, meaning that 
they are disproportionately likely to respond to a tax incentive 
by shifting assets from a taxable investment account to a tax-
preferred investment account.280 To that extent, the tax prefer-
ence provides a tax shelter that does not translate into a net in-
crease in overall savings.281 In contrast, lower- and middle-
income households are less likely to have other assets on hand, 
 
 275. Id. § 408A. 
 276. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2005, ANALYTICAL PER-
SPECTIVES 290–93 tbl.18-2 (2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf. 
 277. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 56–57. 
 278. See William G. Gale et al., The Saver ’s Credit: Expanding Retirement 
Savings for Middle- and Lower-Income Americans (Ret. Sec. Project, Wash., 
D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 4, available at http://brookings.edu/views/papers/ 
20050310orszag.pdf. 
 279. PETER ORSZAG & JONATHAN ORSZAG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRI-
ORITIES, WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT 
SECURITY FOR LOWER- AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES? 3 (2001), http://www 
.cbpp.org/4-2-01tax2.pdf. 
 280. See Gale et al., supra note 278, at 1. 
 281. Id. at 1, 8; ORSZAG & GREENSTEIN, supra note 271, at 14–16. 
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and their contributions to tax-preferred accounts are more 
likely to represent a net increase in overall savings.282 
The Bush Administration has adopted an expansion of tax 
incentives as the centerpiece of its savings agenda. The Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EG-
TRRA) substantially raised tax preference caps through 
2010,283 and the PPA makes those increases permanent.284 The 
Administration also is on record in support of additional future 
tax breaks.285 
Put simply, this agenda is misguided. Since only 5 or 6% of 
all taxpayers make the maximum tax-free contributions cur-
rently permitted, expanded tax preferences would principally 
benefit only a small segment of high-income earners.286 Sound 
pension policy reform, instead, should focus on directing incen-
tives to low- and middle-income workers. This focus would as-
sist those workers with the least retirement security and would 
also have the salutary effect of increasing overall net sav-
ings.287 
The Saver’s Credit, enacted in 2001 as part of EGTRRA, 
takes an important first step in this direction.288 The Saver’s 
Credit, which Congress also extended in the PPA,289 provides a 
government matching contribution in the form of a tax credit 
for voluntary individual contributions to 401(k) plans, IRAs, 
and similar retirement savings arrangements.290 The legisla-
tion adopts a progressive structure; the rate of government 
 
 282. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 1, 8. 
 283. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 284. H.R. 4, 109th Cong. § 811 (2006); H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORK-
FORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT 
(H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 285. Press Release, Office of Public Affairs of the U.S. Treasury, The Presi-
dent’s Savings Proposals: Tax-Free Savings and Retirement Security Oppor-
tunities for All Americans (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.treasury.gov/press/ 
releases/js1131.htm. 
 286. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 7; David Joulfaian & David Richardson, 
Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Savings Programs? Evidence from Fed-
eral Income Tax Data, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 669, 674–85 (2001). 
 287. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 1, 7–8; ORSZAG & GREENSTEIN, supra 
note 271, at 14–17. 
 288. I.R.C. § 25B (West 2006). 
 289. H.R. 4, 109th Cong. § 812 (2006); H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORK-
FORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 
4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 290. H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY 
OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
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subsidy falls as household income rises.291 The credit rate is 
50% for an unmarried taxpayer with an adjusted gross income 
of up to $15,000, 20% for taxpayers with an adjusted gross in-
come between $15,001 and $16,250, and 10% for taxpayers 
with an adjusted gross income between $16,251 and $25,000.292 
The same credit rates apply to married couples filing jointly 
with the adjusted gross income bounds multiplied by a factor of 
two.293 By using this progressive structure, the Saver’s Credit 
works to level the playing field by correcting for the inherent 
bias of tax exclusions that favor taxpayers with higher mar-
ginal rates. 
The Saver’s Credit, however, like other pure tax credit 
measures, only confers a benefit on taxpayers who have a fed-
eral income tax liability against which to apply the credit. Be-
cause many low-income individuals owe little or no federal tax, 
more than 80% of the fifty-nine million tax filers who otherwise 
would qualify for the maximum 50% credit are excluded from 
participation, while many others are eligible for only a fraction 
of what theoretically is available on paper.294 As a result, the 
Saver’s Credit fails to encourage savings among a large group 
of low-income earners who are at the greatest risk of a finan-
cially insecure retirement. 
In order to reach this low-earner group, some type of af-
firmative contribution or refundable tax credit is needed. Policy 
analysts have proposed a variety of solutions in this vein. For-
mer President Jimmy Carter’s Commission on Pension Policy, 
for example, proposed a mandatory minimum employer contri-
bution of 3% of payroll for every employee over the age of 
twenty-five who works more than 1000 hours per year.295 More 
common are proposals that call for leveraged government fund-
ing, such as former President William Clinton’s proposal for a 
system of universal savings accounts financed by a combination 
of direct and matching contributions.296 Whatever the details, 
 
 291. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 3. 
 292. H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 109TH CONG., BILL SUMMARY 
OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT (H.R. 4) (Comm. Print 2006). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 8. 
 295. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 181 (summarizing the 
Carter plan); Weller, supra note 63, at 26–40 (summarizing various pension 
reform proposals); supra notes 151–55, 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 296. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 45, at 181–82 (summarizing the 
Clinton plan); Weller, supra note 63, at 26–40 (summarizing various pension 
reform proposals); supra notes 151–55, 169–70 and accompanying text (outlin-
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some form of program targeted at low and moderate earners as 
a supplement to Social Security is needed in order to prime the 
pump for additional savings by workers who need it most. 
Studies show that these incentives can be effective, even among 
workers with relatively few resources at hand.297 
The easiest path to take at this point would be to expand 
the Saver’s Credit program by making the credit refundable. 
Under this approach, the government would substitute a mone-
tary payment in lieu of an income tax credit for those individu-
als who make a matching contribution to a qualifying pension 
or savings program, but who do not have a sufficient tax liabil-
ity to make use of the tax credit. The monetary payment, in 
other words, would mirror the credit in terms of income limita-
tions, benefit amounts, and progressivity.298 It should be un-
derscored that this reform would not result in a direct transfer 
payment to any individual, but only to a retirement or savings 
account to which the individual also is required to contribute.299 
This refundability expansion would add approximately $2 
billion to $3 billion per year in cost to the existing Saver’s 
Credit program.300 This additional expenditure could be fi-
nanced by rolling back the tax preferences primarily benefiting 
high-income earners to pre-EGTRRA levels.301 Alternatively, 
we could borrow a page from the new Massachusetts health in-
surance plan and require employers to contribute an extra 1% 
of payroll for those employees with more than a year of service 
who are not offered any form of pension plan.302 In either event, 
it would be money well spent in terms of enhancing overall re-
tirement security. 
 
ing pension reform proposals). 
 297. Michael Sherraden, Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor, 
in ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 
302, 308, 312–16 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001); Esther 
Duflo et al., Savings Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block (Ret. Sec. Project, Wash., 
D.C.), May 2005, at 27, available at http://brookings.edu/views/papers/ 
20050509galeorszag.pdf. 
 298. Gale et al., supra note 278, at 10–11. 
 299. Id. at 11. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Weller, supra note 63, at 13–14. 
 302. See MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 118G-18B (West 2006); Pam Bel-
luck, Massachusetts Sets Health Plan for Nearly All, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, 
at A1 (summarizing 2006 Massachusetts health care legislation that requires 
employers who do not sponsor an employee health plan to contribute to a 
state-sponsored health care program). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Problems abound in the realm of retirement finance. The 
Social Security system is on a collision course with financial in-
solvency. Over one-half of all Americans lack a private pension 
to supplement Social Security benefits. The shrinking minority 
who are covered by a defined benefit pension plan are seeing 
their employers increasingly renege on pension plan commit-
ments. The growing minority offered an employer-sponsored 
defined contribution plan are seeing their potential nest eggs 
diluted by inertia, job-change leakages, and an over-
concentration in company stock. Meanwhile, personal savings 
have plunged into negative territory. If all three legs of the re-
tirement stool continue on this course, a perfect storm of re-
tirement insecurity will wreak havoc with the burgeoning baby-
boom generation of retirees. 
This perfect storm is not inevitable, however. As this Arti-
cle illustrates, a wide variety of options exists to improve re-
tirement security. The problem is not a lack of possible solu-
tions, but a lack of political will. So far, neither political party 
has been willing to take responsibility—or blame—for the nec-
essary agenda of increasing taxes, trimming benefits, and en-
hancing regulatory oversight. Both parties, instead, primarily 
have treated the matter of retirement security as a wedge is-
sue, with each party pointing to the other as obstructionist. 
But the PPA illustrates that meaningful reform is possible 
when Congress sets political bickering aside and engages in a 
practical, bipartisan mode of problem-solving. That same ap-
proach should now be directed at devising a broad-based pack-
age of measures that will shore up all three legs of the retire-
ment stool. 
This Article provides one possible set of proposals for such 
a reform agenda. The ingredients of that agenda consist of 
three practical and not particularly painful steps. First, the So-
cial Security system could be saved from insolvency through a 
mix of relatively small payroll tax hikes and benefit reductions, 
including a slight rise in the retirement age. Second, with de-
fined contribution plans becoming the new pension norm, 
changes in setting account default options could encourage both 
greater plan participation and improved plan security. Third, 
Congress could implement a modest refundable tax credit to 
encourage low- and middle-income earners to build their own 
supplemental nest eggs. 
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The recommendations set out in this Article underscore a 
crucial aspect of the policy debate: the reforms needed to re-
store retirement security are not paradigm-shifting or un-
bearably painful. In the end, what is needed to avoid the loom-
ing perfect storm of retirement insecurity is not some systemic 
overhaul, but a common sense program of shared responsibil-
ity. 
